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SUPERSIZING DAUBERT SCIENCE FOR LITIGATION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL PRACTICE AND
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
GARY EDMOND*
I.

INTRODUCTION: SCIENCE FOR LITIGATION AND THE

EXCLUSIONARY ETHOS

T

HIS essay is about sciencefor litigation, its implications and limitations.'
"Science for litigation" is expert evidence specifically developed for
litigation-extant, pending or anticipated.2 Although, as we shall see, federal
judges have demonstrated a curious tendency to restrict the concept to
expert evidence associated with litigation which is underway or pending.
Ordinarily, expert evidence developed for, or tailored to, litigation carries
an epistemic stigma. Conventionally, the fact that expert evidence is oriented toward a specific goal is thought to impair the independence of the
experts and the reliability of their evidence. This often manifests in concerns that evidence developed for litigation is inconsistent with scientific
knowledge and the opinions of experts not embroiled in litigation. That
is, scientific evidence designed or refined for legal purposes is thought to
be in tension with the independent and methodologically rigorous research undertaken by the scientific community. In consequence, science
for litigation is widely considered unreliable and for that reason threatening to routine legal processes. The experts responsible for science for litigation are often vilified as partisan and sometimes even condemned as
3
charlatans.
* BA(Hons) University of Wollongong, LLB(Hons) University of Sydney, PhD
University of Cambridge. Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of
New South Wales, Sydney 2052, Australia. Email: g.edmond@unsw.edu.au. I
would like to thank Villanova Law School for the generous invitation as well as
David Caudill, Lash LaRue, Penny Pether, Robert Nelson, David Mercer, an
anonymous referee, Gretchen Tomanek, Ian Mahoney and the other editors of the
Villanova Law Review. A version of this paper was presented at the Norman J.
Shachoy Annual Symposium, Villanova Law School and to the Faculty of Law,
University of Windsor.
1. When I use the italicized form (e.g., science for litigation), I am referring to
the concept of science for litigation rather than evidence which is developed, prepared or organized with some sensitivity to actual or anticipated litigation.
2. "Anticipated" might be interchanged with "foreseeable." There are many
different names for science for litigation including "litigation-generated science,"
'junk science," "partisan science" and so on. For an informative discussion, see
David Michaels & Les Boden, Litigation-Generated Science: Why Should We Care?,
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.

(forthcoming).

3. For a variety of reasons, not always principled or convincing, less attention
is focused on the lawyers.

(857)
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This essay reviews these ideas. It aims to challenge some of the commitments guiding contemporary evidence jurisprudence and to refocus attention on expert evidence and scientific knowledge developed in
anticipationof litigation. To state the position more starkly, this essay will
explain how recent judicial characterizations of expertise bear limited resemblance to modern forms of practice or recent scholarship on science
and technology. The practical upshot is that federal judges have developed admissibility tools, like sciencefor litigation, which are not only remote
from real world practice but draconian and potentially misleading.
Even though expert evidence is always selected, adapted, translated
and simplified for use in legal contexts, this essay will not pretend that we
should disregard these processes. Instead, it endeavors to explain why origins and orientations should be the starting point of any assessment rather
than some banal conclusion. In developing this position, this essay explains how the kinds of scientific research which are normally considered
to be independent and reliable have much in common with the expert
evidence often pejoratively associated with plaintiffs and partisan experts.
For, a large proportion of modern scientific research, especially research
related to pharmaceuticals, chemicals, weapons, the environment and
public health, is sponsored by for-profit corporations and oriented to their
commercial interests. Modern corporations are acutely sensitive to regulatory requirements and the possibility of being sued for the effects of their
products and activities. While the ideas motivating judicial recourse to
science for litigation are faulty, by applying the concept more consistently
(i.e. more symmetrically) to the evidence sponsored and developed by
civil defendants and even the state's forensic scientific evidence, we can
begin to identify limitations and reflect on how we might begin to reform
practice.
The essay also suggests, although these ideas are developed in greater
detail elsewhere, that in recent decades judges have imposed more onerous admissibility standards in response to a range of converging social,
logistical and ideological pressures. 4 The flawed models of science and
expertise guiding legal practice and federal jurisprudence have not, after
all, sprung from nowhere. It is important, therefore, to approach recent
changes in admissibility jurisprudence with sensitivity to a range of
broader socio-legal problematics. 5 These problems include widespread anxiety about too much litigation; legal irrationality; insurance crises; the
prevalence of unreliable expertise and "junk science"; the capabilities of
4. See SKAPP, Daubert The Most Influential Supreme Court Ruling You've
Never Heard of (2003); Gary Edmond, Just Truth? A PartialArchaeology of the Admissibility Revolution Associated with Daubert (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=916062 [hereinafter Edmond, Just Truth].
5. SeeJOSEPH GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS (1976). Whether

these are actually problems remains controversial, although almost all of the scholarly research suggests popular impressions are grossly exaggerated.
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layjuries; and the debilitating impact of litigation on research and innovation, especially investment in pharmaceuticals and manufactured goods.
So, with this in mind, we move to consider science for litigation and
some of its practical limitations and political implications. It will soon become clear that, as it stands, the concept performs important ideological
work. Science for litigation systematically disadvantages civil plaintiffs. It reinforces the threat posed by socio-legal problems and the perceived need
for continuing judicial vigilance. Focusing attention on the expert evidence adduced by plaintiffs also elides the activities and strategic orientations of research sponsored by for-profit corporations.
A.

Background: Daubert and the Exclusionary Ethos

In order to orient this discussion, it is important to describe the exclusionary ethos emerging in the federal circuits during the 1980s and consolidated by the Supreme Court's Daubert,6 Joiner7 and Kumhos decisions in the
1990s. 9 By now most readers will be conversant with the Supreme Court's
Daubert Trilogy so this introduction will be appropriately succinct.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,10 the Supreme Court
heard an appeal on the admissibility standard for scientific evidence in
federal courts according to the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 1 Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." 12 Justice Blackmun, author of the
majority opinion, advocated a "relevance and reliability" approach. 13 He
explained that the Federal Rules of Evidence required "scientific knowl6. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
8. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
9. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Daubert and the Exclusionary Ethos: The
Convergence of Corporate andJudicial Attitudes Towards the Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Tort Litigation, 26 L. & POL'Y 231 (2004).
10. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
11. See id.
12. At the time of the Daubert appeal, Rule 702 stated: "If scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975). It was amended in 2000 as
follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EviD. 702 (2000). Other rules, such as Rules 102, 401, 402, 703, 704 and
705, may also have a bearing on admissibility decision-making.
13. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
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edge" to "be derived by the scientific method."1 4 To help federal judges
identify reliable scientific knowledge, Blackmun provided the following
criteria (hereafter "the Daubert criteria"):
[1] Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining
whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will
assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been)
tested. "Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed,
this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields
of human inquiry." Green 645. See also C. Hempel, Philosophy
of Natural Science 49 (1966) ("[T]he statements constituting a
scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test"); K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific
Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989) ("[T]he criterion of the scientific
status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability")
(emphasis deleted).
[2] Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication.
Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a
sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with
reliability, see S. Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as
Policymakers 61-76 (1990), and in some instances well-grounded
but innovative theories will not have been published, see Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990). Some propositions,
moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest
to be published. But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific
community is a component of "good science," in part because it
increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology
will be detected. See J. Ziman, Reliable Knowledge: An Exploration of the Grounds for Belief in Science 130-33 (1978); Relman
& Angell, How Good Is Peer Review ?, 321 New Eng. J. Med. 827
(1989). The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer- reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive,
consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular
technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.
[3] Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique,
the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate
of error, see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 (7th
Cir. 1989) (surveying studies of the error rate of spectrographic
voice identification technique), and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation, see
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (not14. Id. at 590.
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ing professional organization's standard governing spectrographic analysis), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
[4] Finally, "general acceptance" can yet have a bearing on the
inquiry. A "reliability assessment does not require, although it
does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of
acceptance within that community." United States v. Downing, 753
F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985). See also 3 Weinstein & Berger
702[03], pp. 702-41 to 702-42. Widespread acceptance can be an
important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and "a
known technique which has been able to attract only minimal
support within the community," Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238, may
15
properly be viewed with skepticism.
According to the majority, these criteria were to be applied flexibly:
"The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one."' 6
Two of the justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens, dissented on the ground that the majority placed excessive reliance on definitions of science drawn from non-legal writings (e.g., the work of the
philosophers Hempel and Popper referred to in [1])-effectively requiring judges to "become amateur scientists." 17 Though confident about the
capabilities of federal judges, Rehnquist (and Stevens) expressed pragmatic reservations.1 8 He was unsure what "falsifiability" meant and how it
might be applied by legally-trained judges:
The Court [i.e. the majority] speaks of its confidence that federal
judges can make a "preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can
be applied to the facts in issue."... The Court then states that a
"key question" to be answered in deciding whether something is
"scientific knowledge" "will be whether it can be (and has been)
tested." [see [1] above] Following this sentence are three quotations from treatises, which not only speak of empirical testing,
but one of which states that the "'criterion of the scientific status
of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."'
I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I
am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its "falsifiability," and I suspect
some of them will be, too.
15. Id. at 593-94. In the quoted material, "Green" refers to Michael D. Green,
Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of
Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. Rv. 643 (1991-1992).
16. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.

17. See id. at 598-601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18. See id.
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I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some
gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. But I do not think it imposes
on them either the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role.1 9
Six years after Daubert, the Supreme Court heard another appeal on
the admissibility of expert evidence. This time the Court addressed the
standard for non-scientific forms of expert evidence. This was the other
portion of Rule 702 concerned with "technical, or other specialized knowledge." In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,20 the Court firmly endorsed the

Daubert decision-no dissent this time-explaining that the four criteria
might be applicable in all expert evidence admissibility determinations.

21

Once again the Court emphasized the importance of "flexibility" in the
application of the Daubert criteria. 22 Unlike the Daubert appeal-which
was remanded to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals-in Kumho the majority applied the new admissibility standard for "technical, or other specialized knowledge" to the case before them. 23 With the exception of
Justice Stevens, the Court excluded the plaintiffs' engineering evidence
because it did not pass the inflexible application of all four of the Daubert
24
criteria.
Daubert and Kumho Tire consolidated a more widespread tightening of
admissibility standards and encouraged trial judges to act uncompromisingly as evidentiary gatekeepers.2 5 The choice of the gatekeeping metaphor
might be considered quite revealing in this context. In GeneralElectric Co.

v. Joiner,26 another appeal concerned with -expert evidence, the Supreme
Court underscored the importance of judicial gatekeeping by insulating
27
the trial judge's admissibility determinations from appellate review. After Joiner, appellate courts were required to identify an abuse of the trial
judge's discretion to activate their power to intervene. The Supreme
19. Id. at 600-01 (internal citations omitted).
20. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
21. See id. at 141.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 141-42.
24. See id. at 157-58; see also Gary Edmond, Legal Engineering: Contested Representations of Law, Science (and Non-Science) and Society, 32 Soc. STUD. Sci. 371 (2002);
Robert Mosteller, Finding the Golden Mean with Daubert: An Elusive, Perhaps an Impossible, Goal, 52 VILL. L. REv. 723 (2007).

25. The litigation surrounding Bendectin is an example of this broader tightening, as is the recognition by reform proponents like Huber and Foster. See
PHANTOM RJSK: ScIErrFlc INFERENCE AND THE LAw 39-40 (Kenneth R. Foster et al.
eds., 1993).
26. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
27. See id. at 146-47. Interestingly, the Joinerdecision tempered the extreme
confidence Blackmun and the Daubert majority had placed in "the scientific
method." Blackmun had suggested that method was so important that judges
could focus on methodology rather than experts' conclusions. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
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Court explained that there was to be no "fresh" or "hard look" at the exclusion of plaintiff's expert evidence unless the trial judge's decision was
all of the
palpably mistaken. 28 In Joiner the Supreme Court also invoked
29
Daubert criteria to exclude the plaintiffs' expert evidence.
Together, Daubertand its progeny have exerted a stultifying effect on
30
Trial
tort and product liability suits filed in federal courts and beyond.
judges are encouraged to act as vigilant gatekeepers, and appellate courts
are prevented from interfering unless trial judges clearly abuse their wide
discretions. In consequence, plaintiffs frequently struggle to have their
expert evidence admitted. The changes to practice have been so
profound that it has become normal to have pre-trial admissibility hearings for expert evidence (now called Daubert hearings) upon which the
fate of civil actions often depends. Plaintiffs who are unable to introduce
expert evidence are often left without a viable cause of action.
Against this backdrop, we consider science for litigation. Here, we can
observe how judges (and others) have enlarged the practically demanding
Daubert criteria with supplementary concerns about the purpose and origins of expert evidence.
II.

SCIENCE FOR LITIGATION THE Locus ClAssicus

Notwithstanding the emphasis on "flexibility" in the Daubert and
Kumho Tire judgments, in practice federal judges have scrupulously followed the Supreme Court's example. Federal trial judges customarily approach (and apply) the Daubert criteria as an inflexible checklist. Every
day in courts across America the Daubert criteria are used to exclude plaintiffs' expert evidence. For a number of reasons this is unfortunate. First,
because the models of science in Daubert have little to tell us about modern expertise and its diverse forms. Second, when the criteria are com31
bined, they tend to produce a very demanding admissibility threshold.
We might call the combination and inflexible application of all four criteria hard Daubert. The Joiner and Kumho Tire appeals were important and
highly influential demonstrations of hard Daubert.
Already formidable, the burden upon plaintiffs in the wake of Daubert
is amplified where judges supplement Daubert's checklist with additional
28. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142-43.

29. See id. at 146-47.
30. See LLOYD DIXON & BRAN GILL, CHANGES IN
TING EXPERT

THE STANDARDS FOR ADMIT-

EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION

(2001); Joe S. Cecil, Ten Years ofJudicial Gatekeeping Under Daubert, 95 Am.J. PUB.
HEALTH S74 (2005).
31. While each criterion has serious limitations, in combination they are sociologically and philosophically incoherent. When this incoherent assemblage is
used as an inflexible checklist, the standard can become incredibly onerous. See
Gary Edmond & David Mercer, What Judges Should Know About Falsificationism,5
EXPERT EVIDENCE 29 (1997); Adina Schwartz, A "Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited:

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 149 (1997).
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factors. Admissibility thresholds become even more exacting where the
pervasive exclusionary ethos leads judges to supplement the Daubert criteria
with concerns about the origins and orientation of expert evidence. At
this point, I want to re-introduce the concept of science for litigation. Incorporating questions about the origins and purpose of evidence into the
admissibility matrix operates to supersize the considerable exclusionary po32
tential of hard Daubert.
A.

Supersizing Daubert: Science for Litigation as an
Admissibility Supplement

In recent years, one of the more prominent expressions of science for
litigation appeared in Judge Kozinski's response to the Supreme Court's
remand of the Daubert case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 33 This
judgment provides an instructive example ofjudicial anxiety about science
for litigation, confidence in the value of independence and the redemptive potential of the scientific method, peer review and publication.
Writing for the court, Kozinski prefaced his admissibility jurisprudence with the following remarks, intended to convey some of the difficulties confronting federal judges:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme
Court's [Daubert] opinion, is to resolve disputes among
respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely
within their expertise, in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what is not "good science," and occasionally to reject such expert testimony because it was not "derived by
the scientific method." Mindful of our position in the federal ju34
diciary, we take a deep breath and proceed with this heady task.
In the remainder of the judgment it becomes clear that rather than
preoccupy himself with the detail of "the scientific method," Kozinski was
intent on supplementing the Supreme Court's opinion with more funda32. See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supersize (last visited Apr.
24, 2007).
The term supersized is a marketing technique that was developed in the
mid-90s by McDonalds. Employees would ask 'Would you like that supersized?' or 'Would you like to supersize that?', after taking an order....
The idea behind this promotion is that for an extra 49 cents a customer
could dramatically increase the size of his or her meal. This promotion
was such a success that other fast food chains, such as Burger King and
Wendy's, started their own versions of this marketing technique.... Immediately after the beginning of its use, popular culture adopted the
term in a positive light. To supersize meant to make something better by
making it bigger .... The term is no longer in use for its original purpose, due to negative connotations with obesity.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
33. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
34. Id. at 1316.
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mental tools capable of identifying "good science" and resolving expert
35
disagreement.
The following extract captures Kozinski's thinking about law and science. As it suggests, the origins or purpose of expert testimony will ordinarily be a "very significant fact" for consideration in admissibility
decision-making.
[5] One very significantfact to be considered is whether the experts are
proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of
research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they
have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying. That
an expert testifies for money does not necessarily cast doubt on
the reliability of his testimony, as few experts appear in court
merely as an eleemosynary gesture. But in determining whether proposed expert testimony amounts to good science, we may not ignorethefact
that a scientist's normal workplace is the lab or the field, not the courtroom or the lawyer's office. [FN 5]
[FN5] There are, of course, exceptions. Fingerprint analysis,
voice recognition, DNA fingerprinting and a variety of other scientific endeavors closely tied to law enforcement may indeed
have the courtroom as a principal theatre of operations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 1994) (admitting expert testimony concerning a DNA match as proof the
defendant committed sexual abuse and murder). As to such disciplines, the fact that the expert has developed an expertise principally for purposes of litigation will obviously not be a
substantial consideration.3 6
[6] That an expert testifies based on research he has conducted independent of the litigation provides important, objective proof that the research
comports with the dictates of good science. See Peter W. Huber,
Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom 206-09 (1991)
(describing how the prevalent practice of expert-shopping leads
to bad science). For one thing, experts whose findings flow from
existing research are less likely to have been biased toward a particular conclusion by the promise of remuneration; when an expert prepares reports and findings before being hired as a
witness, that record will limit the degree to which he can tailor
his testimony to serve a party's interests. Then, too, independent
research carries its own indicia of reliability, as it is conducted, so
35. See id. at 1316-22. No judges have discussed the detail of Popper and
Hempel's philosophy or the extensive criticism flowing from their efforts. Legal
discourse on "the scientific method" tends to be based on lay versions of testing.
The actual complexity of testing, particularly what counts as a decisive test, is frequently lost. See Harry Collins, Public Experiments and Displays of Virtuosity: The CoreSet Revisited, 18 Soc. STUD. Sci. 725 (1988).
36. Id. at n.5.
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to speak, in the usual course of business and must normally satisfy a variety of standards to attract funding and institutional support. Finally, there is usually a limited number of scientists
actively conducting research on the very subject that is germane
to a particular case, which provides a natural constraint on parties' ability to shop for experts who will come to the desired conclusion. That the testimony proffered by an expert is based directly on
legitimate, preexisting research unrelated to the litigation provides the
most persuasive basisfor concluding that the opinions he expresses were
"derived by the scientific method."
[7] If the proffered expert testimony is not based on independent research, the party proffering it must come forward with
other objective, verifiable evidence that the testimony is based on
"scientifically valid principles." One means of showing this is by
proof that the research and analysis supporting the proffered
conclusions have been subjected to normal scientific scrutiny
through peer review and publication. [FN 6] Huber, Galileo's
Revenge at 209 (suggesting that "[tlhe ultimate test of [a scientific expert's] integrity is her readiness to publish and be
damned").
[FN 6] We refer, of course, to publication in a generally-recognized scientific journal that conditions publication on a bona
fide process of peer review. See Daubert,-at U.S.-, 113 S.Ct at
2797 ("The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer-reviewed
journal thus will be... relevant .... ) (emphasis added). See generally The Journal's Peer-Review Process, 321 New Eng. J.Med. 837
(1989).
Peer review and publication do not, of course, guarantee that the
conclusions reached are correct; much published scientific research is greeted with intense skepticism and is not borne out by
further research. But the test under Daubertis not the correctness
of the expert's conclusions but the soundness of his methodology. See n. 11 infra. That the research is accepted for publication in a
reputablescientificjournalafter being subjected to the usual rigors of peer
review is a significant indication that it is taken seriously by other scientists, i.e., that it meets at least the minimal criteria of good science.
Daubert,509 U.S. at 593 ("[S]crutiny of the scientific community is
a component of 'good science.'"). If nothing else, peer review
and publication "increase the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected." Daubert, -U.S.
at-, 113
S.Ct..2797. [FN7]
[FN7] For instance, peer review might well have brought to light
the more glaring arithmetical errors in the testimony presented
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by plaintiffs' experts in other Bendectin cases. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 791 F:Supp. 1042, 1048 (D.N.J.
37
1992), affd, 6 F.3d 778 (3d Cir.1993).
Given the formidable task confronting busy federal judges, it might
be considered unremarkable that readily identifiable indicia-such as the
purpose of a study or report-seem to hold considerable interest for Kozinski and the federal judiciary. 38 After all, concern with the origins and purpose of knowledge shifts the focus from technical details, competence and
assessments of "falsifiability" to bright line questions about publication,
motivations and the obvious pecuniary interests held by experts.
In order to assistjudges with admissibility determinations, in the wake
of Daubert, Kozinski introduced three heuristics:
(i) scientific evidence developed independent oflitigation is inherently reliable;
(ii) scientific evidence developed for litigation is inherently suspect; and
(iii) "peer review and publication" (and to some extent "the scientific method" or "the policy statement of an association") have
the potential to rehabilitate (or guarantee) purposive or directed
39
research.
For Kozinski, research conducted "on the very subject that is germane
to a particular case" before litigation commences is proof that the evi37. Id. at n.7. There are literally hundreds of federal court cases with similar
expressions and commitments.
38. A quick search of United States Courts of Appeals decisions disclosed the
following verbatim reproductions of Kozinski's wording: Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc.,
421 F.3d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 2005); Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049,
1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Four Pillars Enter. Co., 45 Fed.
Appx. 479, 483-84 (6th Cir. 2002); Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832,
841 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 166 (3d Cir. 1999);
Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 1997). The most recent
of these cases, Fuesting, draws attention to the fact that Kozinski's concerns have
been incorporated into the Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 702. In addition
to the four Daubert criteria, "the 2000 Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 702
suggest other benchmarks for gauging expert reliability, including ... (6) whether
the testimony relates to 'matters growing naturally and directly out of research
they have conducted independent of the litigation,' or developed 'expressly for
the purposes of testifying'.

. .

." Feusting,421 F.3d at 534.

39. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317-19. Elsewhere in his judgment Kozinski
explains:
For such a showing to be sufficient, the experts must explain precisely
how they went about reaching their conclusions and point to some objective source-a learned treatise, the policy statement of a professional association, a published article in a reputable scientific journal or the liketo show that they have followed the scientific method, as it is practiced by
(at least) a recognized minority of scientists in their field.
Id. at 1319.
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dence is "independent" and implicitly reliable. 40 But he goes even further. Kozinski characterizes testimony based on "preexisting research
unrelated to the litigation" as "legitimate" and "the most persuasive basis
for concluding that the opinions" were "derived by the scientific method"
41
Emphasis is placed on fact
and are taken seriously by other scientists.

that "a scientist's normal workplace is the lab or the field" and "not the
courtroom or the lawyer's office."' 42 It would seem that "good science"to which we might add genuine science and sound science--is outside the in-

fluence of, or insensitive to, law and litigation (and regulation). Kozinski
is sufficiently concerned with the distorting effects of litigation to suggest
that scientific research which takes place beyond the influence of the
courtroom is likely to be methodologically pure. 43 Such an approach, as
we shall see, blinds Kozinski-and judges embracing hard Daubert and science for litigation-to the socially-embedded and commercially-oriented nature of scientific practice.
Where the expert evidence is not litigation-free-that is, not independent of litigation-Kozinski places a burden on the proffering party to
demonstrate that it is nevertheless "objective, verifiable evidence ... based
on 'scientifically valid principles.' "44 One way, and indeed the only means
suggested, of overcoming the evidentiary stigma of science for litigation is
through peer review and publication. For Kozinski, independence is assumed where knowledge claims have been exposed to "normal scientific
scrutiny through peer review and publication." 45 "Establishing that an expert's proffered testimony grows out of pre-litigation research or that the
expert's research has been subjected to peer review are the two principal
ways the proponent of expert testimony can show that the evidence satisfies the first prong of Rule 702."46

Here, the second of the Daubert criteria [2] has the potential to provisionally demonstrate independence and reliability. Kozinski, like Blackmun
before him, does not attempt to explain how peer review and publication
actually generate these reliability effects. 4 7 Both judgments concede that
peer review and publication "do not, of course, guarantee that the conclusions reached are correct. '48 In practice, however, these qualifications
tend to be neglected or ignored. Where research is accepted for publica40. See id. at 1317.

41. Id. at 1317-18.
42. Id. at 1317.
43. These claims, as others have noted, are not strictly logical. See SheilaJasanoff, Law's Knowledge: Science forJustice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S49
(2005). In effect, Kozinski presents a kind of tautology. Science depends on peer
review and publishing, rather than the method itself, to prove the correct application of the method.
44. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1318.
45. Id.
46. Id. Kozinski is referring to "assisting the trier of fact" in Rule 702.

47. "Peer review and publication" are, in effect, black boxed.
48. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1318 (emphasis added).
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tion in a reputable scientific journal it seems to satisfy "at least the minimal
criteria of good science" and usually more.
Unfortunately, many of these rather glib assumptions and commitments have little relevance to modern scientific practice. Some, like the
idea of independence and the perceived need to maintain a strict separation
between Science and Law, only obtain evidentiary traction to the extent that
judges are unwilling to critically explore the organization of the modern
sciences, particularly the relations between manufacturers-such as those
producing pharmaceuticals, therapeutic products, foodstuffs, weapons, fuels and chemicals-research funding and the scientific and medical literatures. Kozinski places great weight on popular, if simplistic and frequently
tendentious, impressions of scientific practice, peer review and the scientific literature. At this juncture we turn to consider more empirically informed descriptions of the sciences before moving to examine some of the
practical limitations associated with using sciencefor litigationas an admissibility tool.
III.

AGAINST SCIENCE FOR LITIGATION AND HARD DAUBERP

EMPIRICAL

STUDIES OF THE SCIENCES

A.

Modern Approaches to the Sciences

The admissibility potential of science for litigation is predicated on the
prevalent belief that science is a process which ordinarily manages to separate knowledge (or ways of knowing) from society (i.e. the social and the
subjective). Unlike genuine science or independent science, science for litiga-

tion is understood to fail in this important regard. It is this failure which
renders science for litigation subjective and potentially unreliable. Notwithstanding the popularity of these ideas, research from the sociology,
philosophy and history of science and technology overwhelmingly suggests
that many pervasive ideas about science--and many of the kinds of images
on which Daubertand much expert evidence jurisprudence is predicatedare actually fanciful. Often they bear little or no resemblance to modern
scientific practice. 49 It is useful, in consequence, to consider some of the
ways expert evidence jurisprudence is displaced from contemporary think50
ing about the sciences and technology.
Let's begin with scientific methodology.
B.

A Universal Scientific Method?

In Daubert, Justice Blackmun emphasized the need for "scientific
knowledge" derived using "the scientific method." Recall,
49. Some introductory texts include
VANCED INTRODUCTION

(1997);

STANDING THE SOCIAL STUDY OF SCIENCE

TECHNOLOGY STUDIES

DAVID

J. HESS,

SCIENCE STUDIES: AN AD-

STEVEN YEARLEY, MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE: UNDER-

(2005); and

HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND

(Sheila Jasanoff et. al. eds., 1995).

50. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Experts and Expertise in Legal and Regulatory Settings, in EXPERTISE IN REGULATION AND LAw 1 (Gary Edmond ed., 2004).
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[1] [11n order to qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference
or assertion must be derived by the scientific method ....
Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and
testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry."... See also ... K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations
51

Similarly, on remand, Judge Kozinski linked the purpose and chronology of research to this criterion: "That the testimony proffered by an
expert is based directly on legitimate, preexisting research unrelated to
the litigation provides the most persuasive basis for concluding that the
opinions he expresses were 'derived by the scientific method."' 52 Recourse to the scientific method-exemplified in these extracts from senior
appellate judges-is interesting, and perhaps revealing, when contrasted
with what those who actually study scientists have to say about Popper and
the scientific method more generally.
Most, and perhaps all, contemporary historians and sociologists of science would dismiss the idea of a historically stable, prescriptive and efficacious scientific method doctrine-that is, a universal scientific methodas simply implausible.5 3 Virtually all modern philosophers seem to endorse the following appraisals:
In a nutshell the problem is that all characterizations offered of
scientific method at the level of generalization and abstraction
favoured by philosophers of science fail to be an account of anything specifically scientific. Hence such stories cannot account
54
for what is special about science.
'There is no logic of discovery,'.

. .

there is no logic of testing,

either; all the formal algorithms proposed for testing, by Carnap,
by Popper, by Chomsky, etc., are, to speak impolitely, ridiculous: if
you don't believe this, program a computer to employ one of
55
these algorithms and see how well it does at testing theories!

51. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 593 (1993).
52. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317.
53. See HARRY COLLINS & TREVOR
SHOULD KNow ABOUT SCIENCE (1993).

PINCH,

THE

GOLEM: WHAT

EVERYONE

54. W.H. Newton-Smith, Popper, Science and Rationality, in KARL POPPER: PHI13, 16 (Anthony O'Hear ed., 1995).
55. Hilary Putnam, The "Corroboration"of Theories, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL

LOSOPHY AND PROBLEMS

POPPER 221, 238 (Paul Arthur Schilpp ed., 1974). A similar point is made in H.M.
COLLINS,

ARTIFICIAL

EXPERTS:

SOCIAL

KNOWLEDGE

AND

INTELLIGENT MACHINES

(1990).
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To rely on testing as the mark of a science is to miss what scientists mostly do and, with it, the most characteristic feature of their
56
enterprise.

There is not a single rule that remains valid under all circumstances and not a single agency to which appeal can always be
57
made.
I think it has to be said that falsificationism, and Popper's account of the 'logic' of scientific method, have to be accounted as
failures. 58

Popper is famous for his strikingly simple view of science. Unfortunately, despite its undoubted charms, the view is much too sim59
ple to be true.
Few qualified observers believe that Popper has succeeded in
solving the problem of induction or in presenting a non-inductive account of science, and many find his model of scientific the60
orizing over-simplified.
What this means is, as the quote from Putnam suggests, there is no
single method or algorithm with which judges can identify authentic or
reliable scientific knowledge. Actual observation of scientists and study of
their publications reveal that formal education and socialization into a research tradition are more important to scientific practice than knowledge
of philosophical formulations or formalized rules. It is no coincidence
that method courses are more common in disciplines with scientific
pretensions, like economics, psychology and sociology, than in the estab6
lished sciences of mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology. '
It is important to appreciate that the foregoing critiques are not limited to the philosophies of Karl Popper (1902-1993) and Carl Hempel
(1905-1997) -whose fundamentally irreconcilable positions were, tellingly, both endorsed in the Supreme Court's Daubertjudgment [1]-but
apply to all philosophical and sociological attempts to identify a universal
method (or methods) underpinning all scientific practice. These days,
there are few scholarly attempts to identify a peculiar scientific rationality
or single principle capable of accommodating the disparate activities assembled under the rubric of the modern sciences. Rather, historians, soci56. Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?, in
AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE

57.
58.

CRITICISM

(Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970).
METHOD 164 (rev. ed., 1988).

1, 10

PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST

DAVID OLDROYD, THE ARCH OF KNOWLEDGE: AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY OF
THE HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE

314 (1986).

59. John Worrall, "Revolution in Permanence": Popper on Theory-Change in Science,
in KARL POPPER: PHILOSOPHY AND PROBLEMS, supra note 54, at 102.

60. Anthony O'Hear, Introductionto

KARL POPPER: PHILOSOPHY AND PROBLEMS

1, 11 (Anthony O'Hear ed., 1995).
61. See Michael Mulkay & G. Nigel Gilbert, PuttingPhilosophy to Work: Karl Popper's Influence on Scientific Practice,11 PHIL. Soc. ScI. 389 (1981).
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ologists and anthropologists have become more interested in the
rhetorical, institutional and social functions of method discourses (i.e. talk
about scientific method).
Writing in the 1980s, two historians of science summarized these
developments:
Over the last two decades .

.

. the traditional belief in the exis-

tence of a single, transferable, efficacious scientific method has
been challenged. This has opened a range of questions about
the actual roles played by methodological doctrines in the development of science and in the social dynamics of scientific
62
communities.
Historical and sociological studies suggest that abstract formulations
of a universal method do not play an important role in scientific research.
Instead, method discourses fulfill an important and conspicuous role in
science education, science communication, policy interventions and the
resolution of scientific controversy.
After thefact, scientists often account for their activities and discoveries
in terms of rigorous adherence to the scientific method. Retrospectively,
scientists tend to characterize their activities and inquiries as peculiarly
rational. Although, as sociologists, historians and anthropologists have repeatedly demonstrated, these retrospective accounting practices often
bear the most tenuous relations with actual practice (i.e. what actually happened). They frequently fail to explain that what counts as methodological propriety is part of the scientific consensus which emerges at the end
of a controversy rather than the means of actually resolving controversy or
63
prescriptively determining the contours of nature.
In consequence, it would seem that manyjudges have been discussing
scientific method discourses as if they prescriptively guided modern scientific practice. 64 In this way judges have been appealing to the rhetorical
(and marketing) dimensions of the sciences rather than confronting the
technical aspects of controversy, uncertainty and disagreement or the
more difficult process of choosing amongst assemblages of methods (in
the plural), equipment, assumptions, levels of competence, interpretations and so on. 65 The complications, however, are not restricted to
method.
62. John A. Schuster & Richard R. Yeo, Introductionto

THE POLITICS AND RHET-

ORIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD X (John A. Schuster & Richard R. Yeo eds., 1986); see
generally G. NIGEL GILBERT & MICHAEL MULKAY, OPENING PANDORA'S Box: A SocioLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SCIENTISTS' DISCOURSE

63. See H.M.

COLLINS, CHANGING ORDER

(1984).
(1985) [hereinafter

COLLINS, CHANG-

ING ORDER].

S.

(1977).

64. See

THOMAS

65. See

ALAN IRWIN & MIKE MICHAEL, SCIENCE, SOCIAL THEORY AND PUBLIC

KNOWLEDGE

KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION

(2003).
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C.

873

The Norms (and Counter-Norms) of Science

Historical and empirical studies have not been able to identify a set of
institutional commitments or professional norms consistently adhered to
by scientists within a field or sub-discipline, let alone norms embraced by
all scientists and experts. The sociologist Robert Merton (1910-2003) provided an early and influential elaboration of scientific norms and their
functions. Merton's account, itself a response to the rise of totalitarianism
and the suppression of scientific research in Europe, explained the importance of characteristics like communalism, openness, disinterestednessand skepticism to the pursuit of credible scientific research. 66 Today, many
commentators, lacking Merton's historical erudition and theoretical sophistication, have promoted Mertonian-style norms as some kind of essential pre-requisite or description of genuine scientific activity. Not only
does this overstate Merton's actual position, but more recent sociological
research suggests that norms, such as disinterestedness and skepticism, are
susceptible to manipulation and strategic deployment. The following examples will help to illustrate practical limitations with the legal appropriation of the kinds of norms described by Merton in the 1930s and 1940s.
On the basis of a study of NASA moon scientists, Ian Mitroff explained how experienced scientists routinely derogate from Mertonianstyle norms. 6 7 From his observations and interviews, Mitroff concluded
that highly regarded scientists were often passionately committed to pet
theories, sometimes in the face of very damaging evidence.68 In practice,
the NASA scientists tended to be far more skeptical of their rivals' theories
and data than their own. And, the scientists were able to provide reasons
for preferring their own positions. Some of these reasons included concerns about relative levels of competence; underlying assumptions;
(in)consistency with theory, other results and interpretations; reliability of
equipment, and so forth. Inconsistent evidence was almost never interpreted as some kind of definitive refutation or falsification. In addition,
Mitroff's moon scientists were not as cooperative or forthcoming with results and techniques as those committed to Mertonian norms might have
anticipated. Once again the scientists provided (seemingly credible) explanations for their behavior. Reasons for withholding data and materials
included the need to establish priority claims; previous (or anticipated)
failure to reciprocate; protecting the work of graduate students; and waiting for confirmatory studies or actual publication.

66. See ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORTICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1973). Interestingly, Karl Popper was also actively engaged
in social commentary and political philosophy associated with knowledge. See
KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1945).
67. See generally IAN

I.

MITROFF, THE SUBJECTrVE SIDE OF SCIENCE (1974).

68. See id.
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Derogations from idealized norms were so pervasive that Mitroff developed the idea of the counter-norm.69 Mitroff found that scientific practices were explained using a variety of discursive resources. Where
activities seemed to contradict popular normative expectations, scientists
appealed to a range of exceptions and qualifications which helped to excuse or legitimate what might otherwise be understood as deviant behavior. Mitroff characterized these principled or reasoned derogations as
"counter-norms."
Interestingly, and perhaps against expectations, derogation from scientific norms and the invocation of counter-norms did not simply correlate with a scientist's standing or professional credibility. Similarly,
knowledge derived through secret, non-cooperative or interested activities
was not necessarily seen as pathological or unreliable. Instead, Mitroff's
work, like subsequent sociological and anthropological studies of scientists, suggests a much richer realm of scientific practice. 70 Members of
specialist communities are often familiar with the personality and temperament of fellow scientists, as well as their previous work, their abilities,
their commitment to ideas and theories and earlier normative derogations.
Indeed, these are often combined in a complex and morally-inflected evaluation of an expert's capabilities, performance and findings. As with
method discourses, idealized norms and allegations of contravention have
a tendency to arise during periods of controversy.
These, however, are not the only limitations with recourse to idealized
norms. Others, like the sociologist Michael Mulkay, have explained how
norms themselves can create interpretative complexity. 71 Vague normslike openness and skepticism-are unlikely to guide scientific practice or
the assessment of knowledge claims especially in contexts where the behavior, motivations and alignments of scientists as well as technical issues
are all in dispute. If we momentarily reflect on the idea of skepticism, the
significance of under-determination should become clearer. Confronted
with unexpected experimental results, should scientists tinker with their
equipment and assumptions or simply accept the results even if they are
potentially disruptive to widely accepted commitments, background theories and previous findings? Should a scientist be skeptical about the unex69. See Ian Mitroff, Norms and Counter-Norms in a Select Group of the Apollo Moon
Scientists: A Case Study in the Ambivalence of Scientists, 39 AM. Soc. REv. 579 (1974).
70. See KARIN D. KNORR-CETINA, THE MANUFACTURE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY
ON THE CONSTRUCTMST AND CONTEXTUAL NATURE OF SCIENCE (1981); BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1979); MICHAEL LYNCH, ART AND ARTIFACT IN LABORATORY SCIENCE
(1985); SHARON TRAWEEK, BEAMTIMES AND LIFETIMES: THE WORLD OF HIGH ENERGY
PHYSICISTS (1992).

71. See M. Mulkay, Interpretation and the Use of Rules: The Case of the Norms of
Science, in SCIENCE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: A FESTSCHRIFT FOR ROBERT K. MERTON
111 (Robert King Merton & Thomas F. Gieryn eds., 1980); see also STEVE WOOLGAR,
SCIENCE: THE VERY IDEA (1988). For an example of the complexity of scientific
practice, consider S. EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS ACTIVISM AND THE POLITICS OF
KNOWLEDGE

(1996).
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pected results, the sensitivity and reliability of any experimental apparatus,
the theory underlying the equipment and/or the interpretation of the resuits? 7 2 This simple example raises questions about how a skeptical attitude should be embodied in any given situation. It probably will not
surprise lawyers when they are told that norms like skepticism are capable
of being interpreted and applied inconsistently. Moreover, as Mitroff's
study suggests, norms tend to be mobilized strategically. The fact that behaviors, motivations, alignments and technical issues are not easily disentangled means that assessments of knowledge are always socially-inflected
and potentially complex.
Nevertheless, simplistic appeals to norms like disinterestedness, along
with purported derogations, tend to be used frequently and detrimentally
73
in the evaluation of expert evidence.
D.

Wat About Objectivity?

Appeals to objectivity rarely assist in the ultimate resolution of technical controversy. 7 4 Albury, a historian of medicine, helps us to understand
why: "[M]atters of disagreement between scientific experts are not typically conflicts between objectivity on one side and bias on the other, but
conflicts involving two rival conceptions of objectivity-that is, two different ways of assigning relevance to the available data and of interpreting
their meaning." 75 Independence--like objectivity, impartiality, neutrality and

the norm disinterestedness-is primarily a representational category. Such
categories are designed to do work. Their ability to do this (usually depoliticization) work depends upon how scientific performances are represented and categories like "independence" and "objectivity" are cultivated
and managed. 76 Their significance, in relation to the production and reliability of knowledge, is suggestive but not always determinative.
Whether something will be understood as objective/independent or partisan/ biased often depends upon how far an analyst or judge is willing to
delve and what is considered (ir)relevant to the production of scientific
72. These difficulties have been described by Collins as the "experimenter's
regress." See COLLINS, CHANGING ORDER, supra note 63.
73. The leading example is probably The lkarian Reefer, an English case. See
National Justice Compania Naviera SA v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd., [1993] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 68 (Q.B.); see also DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, No MAGIC
WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2006); Gary Edmond, JudicialRepresentations of Scientific Evidence, 63 MOD. L. REv. 216 (2000).
74. See ROBERT N. PROCTOR, VALUE-FREE SCIENCE? (1991); Lorraine Daston &
Peter Galison, The Image of Objectivity, 40 REPRESENTATIONS 81 (1992); Steven
Shapin, Cordelia'sLove: Credibilityand the Social Studies of Science, 3 PERSP. ON SCI. 255

(1995).
75.

RANDALL ALBURY, THE POLITICS OF OBJECTIVITY

42 (1983).

76. See

JAMES FERGUSON, THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: "DEVELOPMENT," DEPOLITICIZATION, AND BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO (1994); JONATHAN POTTER,
REPRESENTING REALIy: DISCOURSE, RHETORIC AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
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knowledge. 77 There will always be interests, alignments, motivations, assumptions, funding relations, theoretical commitments and other aspects
of knowledge-making which might be used to subvert assertions of neutrality. Juxtaposing socially-embedded practice against abstract versions of
method and idealized norms can make just about any knowledge or practice appear social/subjective. We can always invoke (or elide) funding, ambition, competence, methodological and normative compliance (or
derogation), assumptions, institutional affiliations, animosities and so
forth to help mediate objectivity and its reliability effects. It is more difficult
to ascertain how the conditions shaping the production of knowledge
might be used to make useful reliability assessments.
1.

Objectivity, Independence, Science and Commerce

Over time, and especially since the Second World War, images of scientific objectivity and independence have been conspicuously compromised by the changing political economies shaping modern scientific
practice, its institutional manifestations and spatial locations. 78 Today,
most scientific research is financed by for-profit corporations and most
scientists and engineers work in the private sector.
One of the difficulties with recourse to scientific objectivity and independence is that the practices, economic potential (especially military and
medical), institutional arrangements and social standing of the different
sciences actually change. In recent decades many of the sciences have
79
been transformed and traditional disciplinary boundaries weakened.
Perhaps the most conspicuous example-related to tort, product liability
and intellectual property law through pharmaceuticals and genomicsconcerns the commercialization of biotechnology. Biologists, geneticists
and chemists now have historically intimate relationships with commercial
entities which not only fund much of their research but have changed the
way they undertake their science and the way they disseminate knowledge
and experience. Moreover, because of these changes, many scientists are
now engaged, not only in research but also in a range of traditionally nonscientific activities. These might include entrepreneurialism (e.g. fund
raising and venture capitalism), management, marketing, consulting, lobbying and regulation. Many scientists involved in the development and
77. Ultimately, context may explain much, perhaps even everything about the
production and content of knowledge, but not in ways that are always readily accessible. Whether something is considered independent or objective is often the subject
of controversy or disagreement. Whether, and how, that matters can also be
controversial.
78. See PHILIP MIROWSKI, THE EFFORTLESS ECONOMY OF SCIENCE? (2004); PAUL
RABINOW, MAKING PCR: A STORY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY (1996); SCIENCE BOUGHT AND
SOLD: ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE (Philip Mirowski & Esther-Mirjam Sent

eds., 2002).
79. See ANDREw ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DMiSION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988); THOMAS F. GIERYN, CULTURAL BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE (1999).
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testing of pharmaceuticals, for example, are also active in patenting, are
consultants to corporations or directors and participate on public advisory
80
and regulatory bodies.
While scientists have never been able to "mirror nature" in some asocial or parthenogenetic capacity, historically many were probably more independent of the individuals and agencies which funded their research as
well as legal and regulatory issues and commercial considerations. Research was undertaken and often funded on a smaller scale and many of
the agencies and institutions funding research were less concerned with
direct outcomes, intellectual property regimes or transforming discoveries
into technologies, let alone profitable applications. 8 ' In recent years,
funding relationships, like commercial ties and orientations, have become
more direct and more directed, if not always more transparent.8 2 Even
those fields and researchers traditionally more insulated from practical applications and commercialization have been enrolled. Modern scientists,
it would seem, are interested in financial rewards as well as honors, prestige and research funding. Consequently, concepts like independence
and objectivity have become more complicated, if not less (rhetorically)
valuable, in policy advice, regulation and legal decision-making. These issues might not be considered insignificant in an essay on science for
litigation.
Once we begin to develop more elaborate conceptions of scientific
practice, and the socio-economic circumstances in which the modern sciences are firmly and inextricably embedded, then we may need to re-consider what we mean by objectivity. Here, we are not merely concerned with
the research orientation or the conduct and reporting of research, but
also the funding of research, the (indirect) role of scientists and sponsors
in regulatory processes, lobbying for legal and regulatory reform and the
promotion of strategic images of public science.83 Some examples might
prove illuminating.
80. Mercer has described these developments as "the vertical integration of
expertise." David Mercer, Hyper-experts and the Vertical Integration of Expertise in EMF/

RF Litigation, in EXPERTISE

IN REGULATION AND LAW,supra note

50, at 85, 86, 93.

81. See Sheldon Krimsky, et al., Academic-CorporateTies in Biotechnology: A Quantitative Study, 16 Sci. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 275 (1991). It is not my intention to be
overly nostalgic here, or discount the importance of "utility" to natural philosophers like Francis Bacon or patronage to earlier generations of natural philosophers and scientists. See STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH: CIVILITY AND
SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1994).
82. See Robert Proctor, "Everyone Knew but No One Had Proof': Tobacco Industry
Use of Medical History Expertise in US Courts, 1990-2002, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL iv1 17,
ivll8 (2006).
83. Public science refers to general expressions about science and its abilities
designed to enhance the influence and prestige of the organized sciences, and

particularly the standing and prestige of eminent scientists. See FRANK

MILLER TURNER, BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION: THE REACTION TO SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM IN
LATE VICTORIAN ENGLAND

(1974);

FRANK MILLER TURNER, CONTESTING CULTURAL

AUTHORITY: ESSAYS IN VICTORIAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE

(1993).
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The participation of research scientists-with financial connections to
for-profit corporations-on government advisory committees provides
some indication of the limits of objectivity and the close relations between
research, regulation and capital. A recent review of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) expert advisory committees found: "At least one advisory committee member had a financial stake in the topic under review at
146 of the 159 meetings (ninety-two percent). At eighty-eight of the meetings (fifty percent), at least half of the advisory committee members had
financial interests in the product being evaluated." 84 Based on the review
of about 1,600 expert appearances, slightly more than half received a
waiver which allowed them to participate notwithstanding a disclosed conflict of financial interest. The relevant rules state that a federal employee
cannot participate in an official capacity in a matter where that employee
"has a financial interest if the particular matter will have a direct and predictable effect on that interest."85 A second rule dictates the circumstances in which the first rule can be circumvented, and this explains the
hundreds of waivers. 86 Waivers can be issued where an agency head determines that the risk from the conflict is remote or insubstantial or, notwithstanding the potential conflict, the need for the individual's expertise
87
outweighs any risk. The waiver system does not engender confidence.
But consultancies, research sponsorship and representation on government advisory committees are not the only ways for-profit corporations
limit regulatory interference and manipulate perceptions of objectivity.
Large international pharmaceutical manufacturers (known as Pharma),
for example, are actively engaged in law and regulatory reform and, inseparably, public relations. Through the American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA), the pharmaceutical industry has submitted
84. SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF
PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? 96 (2003) [hereinafter KRiMSKY, SciENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST].

85. Id.
86. See Sheldon Krimsky, The Ethical and Legal Foundationsof Scientific 'Conflict
of Interest, in LAw AND ETHICS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 65 (Trudo Lemmens &
Duff R. Waring eds., 2006).

87. Another study, of financial ties between DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) panel members and the pharmaceutical industry,

revealed that more than half of the panels had at least one member with one
financial association with the manufacturers of psychiatric drugs, and that all of
the members of the panels on "Mood Disorders" and "Schizophrenia and Other
Psychotic Disorders" maintained financial ties with pharmaceutical companies. Financial ties included research funding, consultancies, sponsorships, equity inter-

ests, holding patents or copyright, travel funding, appearing as an expert witness
and speaking commitments. According to Cosgrove et al., the anti-psychotic drug
market has global sales of $8.5 billion and anticipated sales of $18.2 billion by
2007. It is probably not surprising that the authors suggest that improving "awareness about the real or perceived COI [conflicts of interest] of panel members is an
important public health issue." Lisa Cosgrove et al., Financial Ties Between DSM-IV
PanelMembers and the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 75 PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS
154, 159 (2006).
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amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court and other senior appellate
courts. Like many other industry briefs, the PMA brief in Daubert decried
the social and economic costs of gratuitous litigation caused by judges who
are unwilling to exclude plaintiffs' 'junk science" and science for litigation
from courtrooms.
The availability of safe and effective drugs depends not only on
the successful functioning of the regulatory scheme administered
by the FDA but also on the proper operation of the tort system.
Whether a given drug has a particular effect is generally a scientific question, and while "science" is not a fixed body of knowledge, there are principles and methodologies that are generally
accepted by scientific communities; there are also sincerely held
individual opinions, based on idiosyncratic views or poorly conducted studies, to which other scientists themselves accord no
weight.... If the tort system were opened up to allow lay juries to
hear and rely on scientific opinions not grounded in generally accepted principles and methodologies-opinions that the relevant
scientific community itself would not rely on-the result would
be to discourage both the marketing of, and research toward,
safe and effective medicines important for the public's health. 8 8
The PMA brief, like other pro-industry submissions, also advanced
models of science and admissibility standards designed to shift attention
from the way corporations sponsor and shape the scientific record.
In addition, members of the PMA, along with other large, for-profit
companies, sponsor think tanks and engage public relations firms with the
intention of popularizing alleged problems with the legal and regulatory
systems. Contributing to popular legal consciousness-Stella Liebeck's incident with McDonald's coffee is exemplary in this regard-they have
sought to harden public attitudes to the allegedly parlous condition of the
civil justice system and in so doing have made formally independent, but
socially vulnerable, judges more defensive. 89 Much of this public relations
work, like the claims in the amicus briefs, sits awkwardly against the empirical findings of non-aligned legal scholars and sociologists.90 Nevertheless,
through political lobbying and campaign funding, Pharma (and other industries) have not only reformed admissibility standards but limited civil
liability and encouraged moves to cap damage awards. At the same time,
88. Brief of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 11, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993) (No. 92-103) (emphasis added).
89. See WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAw: POLITICS,
MEDIA AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004); Michael McCann, William Haltom &
Anne Bloom, JavaJive: Genealogy of ajuridicalIcon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113 (2001).
90. See CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA 137 (2001);
DIXON & GILL, supra note 30; HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 89; TiOMAs H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAw (2001).
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for-profit corporations have been campaigning for wider de-regulation
and insisting that any scientific evidence used in the regulation of their
products and environmental impacts should be based on Daubert-inspired
versions of sound science. Rather than adopt precautionary orientations-

more relevant to modern scientific practice and its limitations-increasingly, corporations are insisting that regulatory interventions should be
based only on evidence that would satisfy hard Daubert.91
Large, well-resourced corporate players-that is, prototypical civil defendants, like large Pharma, chemical companies and automobile manufacturers-are actively engaged at every stage from sponsoring researching
and privatizing knowledge, to patenting organisms and technologies, to
developing and marketing products, to lobbying for the reform of the legal and regulatory regimes in which their products will be used, insinuating consultants and sponsored research onto government committees as
well as helping to shape public and judicial attitudes to litigation and liability through advertising and the media.
With the occasional exception, judicial practice tends to ignore the
many levels and diverse range of activities in which commercial organizations and increasingly retained or aligned scientists participate. Judges
(and many lawyers) tend to construe relevance, reliability and objectivity in

ways that often appear inexplicably narrow and insensitive to context. Frequently, they ignore or disaggregate a company's history and extra-litigation activities-its lobbying efforts, commercial orientation, the
institutional commitment of its researchers and consulting scientists or the
strategic orientation, design and dissemination of its safety and efficacy
research and public definitions of science-from the way they challenge
plaintiffs' expert evidence or actually use evidence when they go to trial.
Rather than consider a defendant's overall record or the socio-institutional framework of which publication is often just one strategic part,
many courts restrict their focus to published or completed research. Extracted from its role in the goals of a vertically integrated commercial enterprise-acutely sensitive to legal and regulatory factors-such restrictive
approaches may elide a deeper set of relations and orientations which
structure research, reporting and external mobilization, as well as the ability to identify fraud, breach of fiduciary duties and corporate malfeasance.
Judges who (un)wittingly blind themselves to these activities, or characterize them as non-scientific or irrelevant, misunderstand modern scientific

91. "Regulatory Daubert" is a good example of this tendency. Compare Alan
Charles Raul &Julie Zampa Dwyer, "RegulatoryDaubert":-A Proposalto EnhanceJudicial Review of Agency Science by IncorporatingDaubert Principles into Administrative Law,
66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2003), with Wendy E. Wagner, Importing Daubert to
Administrative Agencies Through the Information Quality Act, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 589
(2004) and Wendy E. Wagner, The "BadScience" Fiction:Reclaiming the Debate over the
Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 63 (2003).
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enterprises and their relations with organized capital and modern nation
states.
In the context of a discussion on sciencefor litigation, the meaning and
significance of terms like independence, impartiality, neutrality and objectivity

require re-conceptualization. There is conspicuous need to take account
of contemporary social and professional realities. Judges cannot afford to
disregard the fact that modern knowledge is primarily developed for commercial purposes in ways that are acutely sensitive to proprietary issues and
potential risks. It is entirely unpersuasive to think that massive international corporations are insensitive to the legal and regulatory implications
of their products or their efficacy and safety research. It is inappropriate
to persist with simplistic ideas like objectivity and independence, especially
sociologically "thin" versions which focus on whether an expert is appearing for a plaintiff (or defendant), and ignore broader structural influences
and institutional orientations which actually shape many areas of contem92
porary scientific research, regulation and law.
E.

Peer Review and Publication

Judges routinely characterize peer review and publication as means of
warranting the authenticity, independence and reliability of scientific
knowledge. For judges, peer review and publication-but especially the
fact of publication-provide a bright admissibility threshold which is relatively easy to administer. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun included "peer review and publication" among the Daubert criteria.
[2] Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a
sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlatewith relia-

bility, see S.Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers 61-76 (1990), and in some instances well-grounded but
innovative theories will not have been published, see Horrobin, The

Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990). Some propositions, moreover, are too
particular,too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But submis-

sion to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component
of "good science," in part because it increases the likelihood that
substantive flaws in methodology will be detected. See J. Ziman,
Reliable Knowledge: An Exploration of the Grounds for Belief in
Science 130-33 (1978); Relman & Angell, How Good Is Peer Review?, 321 New Eng. J. Med. 827 (1989). The fact of publication
(or lack thereof) in a peer-reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scien92. The idea of "thin" is drawn from the influential work of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973).
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tific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which
93
an opinion is premised.
These sentiments were endorsed and developed in Kozinski's Daubert decision for the Ninth Circuit:
[7] If the proffered expert testimony is not based on independent research, the party proffering it must come forward with
other objective, verifiable evidence that the testimony is based on
"scientifically valid principles." One means of showing this is by
proof that the research and analysis supporting the proffered
conclusions have been subjected to normal scientific scrutiny
through peer review and publication....
Peer review and publication do not, of course, guarantee that the conclusions reached are correct; much published scientiflc researchis greeted with
intense skepticism and is not borne out by further research. But the test

under Daubert is not the correctness of the expert's conclusions
but the soundness of his methodology.... That the research is
accepted for publication in a reputable scientific journal after being subjected to the usual rigors of peer review is a significant
indication that it is taken seriously by other scientists, i.e., that it
94
meets at least the minimal criteria of good science.
Here, peer review and publication are presented as a means of rehabilitating what might otherwise appear to be aligned-that is, implicitly
dependent-scientific testimony. While not infallible, peer review and publication are characterized as a means of guaranteeing "the minimal criteria
of good science." This valorization is consistent with judicial practice.
Judges rarely reflect on the italicized qualifications. Peer review and publication tend to operate as a simple threshold test where reasons for nonpublication and any practical limitations tend to be downplayed or ignored.9 5 These commitments, however, begin to appear problematic
when we compare them with what sociologists have to say about peer review and publication, and seem decidedly fragile when we consider how
the editors of leading scientific and medical journals have been responding to commercialization and the strategic interventions of large Pharma
over the past two decades.
On closer examination, peer review and publication do not always
operate in the rigorously skeptical manner conventionally attributed to
them. Scientific journals, especially the most prestigious, have many,
93. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) (emphasis added).
94. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-18 (1995) (emphasis added).
95. For a qualitative analysis, see Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Conjectures
and Exhumations: Citations of History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science in US Federal
Courts, 14 LAw & LITERATURE 309 (2002).
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sometimes competing, obligations. They have interests in rapid dissemination, maintaining broad appeal, providing the most accurate information available and remaining solvent through subscriptions and sometimes
advertising revenues. 9 6 Increasingly, they have obligations not just to
scientists, engineers and physicians but to security investors, venture capitalists and retirees. Nevertheless, submissions are not always thoroughly
reviewed, not always written by named authors and only very rarely replicated. Perhaps it will not be surprising to find that reviewers tend to be
more sympathetic to those whose views are consonant with or reinforce
their own. 9 7 Remember Mitroff's NASA scientists and the norm of skepticism. Moreover, in recent decades, commercial competition, private funding and concerns about liability have provided new incentives for not
undertaking and not publishing research and imposed new contractual
restrictions on the dissemination of technologies, data and results.
Superficially, peer review and publication might appear to provide a
presumptive indication of reliability. Actual study, however, reveals a
more complex state of affairs. In a longitudinal study of physicists, the
sociologist Harry Collins found that the published literature held a range
of inconsistent meanings to different audiences. 98 Among small groups of
specialists, who were extremely conversant with ongoing controversies in a
particular discipline or sub-field, even articles which had been published
in highly respected, peer-reviewed physicsjournals were often dismissed or
trivialized on the basis of familiarity with the scientists involved and their
earlier work; detailed knowledge of their experiments, equipment and interpretation of results; (alternative) theoretical commitments and assumptions; degrees of (in)competence and attention to detail, and so on. By
way of comparison, those on the peripheries of the sub-group and further
a field-usually unfamiliar with individual scientists (or teams) as well as
the contours of the field-were far more likely to uncritically accept published work.
Revealingly, Collins found that the members of specialist physics communities were most likely to respond to competing theoretical approaches
and results, especially those already in print, when external funding was at
stake. This was particularly conspicuous when those managing the fund96. Krimsky gives the example of the journal TRANSPLANTATION AND DIALYSIS
rejecting a favorably reviewed submission which questioned the benefits of a drug
because of concerns expressed by the journal's marketing department. See Sheldon Krimsky, Publication Bias, Data Ownership, and the Funding Effect in Science:
Threats to the Integrity of Biomedical Research, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS:
REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 61, 72 (2006) [hereinafter Krimsky, PublicationBias].
97. See DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARD J. HACKE-ir, PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER REVIEW AND U.S. SCIENCE POLICY (1990); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990).

98.

See

HARRY COLLINS, GRAVITY'S SHADOW: THE SEARCH FOR GRAVITATIONAL

(2004) [hereinafter

COLLINS, GRAVITY'S SHADOW]; H.M. Collins, Tantalus
and the Aliens: Publications,Audiences and the Search for GravitationalWaves, 29 Soc.

WAVES

STUD. SCI.

163 (1999).
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ing were generalists or had expertise that was considered, by the specialist
physicists, to be insufficiently discriminating. The physicists studied by

Collins intervened because they were worried that a publication-widely
considered by specialists as anomalous, mistaken or even disingenuousmight be considered representative or reliable merely because it had been

refereed and published in a leading international physicsjournal. Factors
like funding decisions could mobilize interested, but otherwise passive or
indifferent, scientists into action and publication. On the basis of this and
other sociological research, the meaning of peer review and publication
appears to depend on a complex range of technical, institutional, professional and social factors. The study by Collins suggests that it may be dangerous to approach the simple fact of publication without some sensitivity
99
to a range of often tacit and subterranean dynamics.

Another important issue with peer review and publication is that their
meaning and significance change across fields and over time. 10 0 Some-

times peer review refers to the refereeing of papers prior to publication.
When papers are reviewed prior to publication, however, the referees are
not very consistent in their performances and editors tend to have a range
of views on how to respond to comments and criticisms. Sometimes peer
review refers to the attention given by the scientific community to papers that
have already been published. Publication also has many valencies. Not all
scientific publications-and this even extends to articles featured in refereed journals-are refereed prior to publication. Indeed, it is common
for conference proceedings to escape refereeing. Many journals feature
non-refereed supplements and few journals devote resources to quantitative reviews of the substance of the articles they publish.1 0 Also, the quality and depth of review varies considerably among publications and
referees. Studies suggest that the average reviewer spends just a couple of
hours refereeing a journal submission and even less time reviewing grant
applications.
Limitations with peer review and publication have become the subject
of more direct discussion and action by a range of scientific publishers,

particularly in relation to public health studies and research into chemicals, pharmaceuticals and other therapeutic products. Recent developments in the medical and scientific literature make judicial confidence
grounds for further disconcert.

99. Collins's study also illustrates how different theoretical commitments and
the politics of fields can profoundly shape the ability to publish and attract public
funding for research.
100. See Marcel LaFollete, Stealing Into PrintFraud,Plagiarism, and Misconduct
in SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING (1992).
101. See Mildred K. Cho & Lisa A. Bero, The Quality of Drug Studies Published in

Symposium Proceedings, 124

ANNALs OF INTERNAL MED.
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Science for Litigation and Recent Controversies in the Scientific and
Medical Literatures

Recent controversies in scientific and medical publishing provide
compelling reasons for believing that judicial confidence in peer review
and publication is fundamentally misplaced. With their attention narrowly focused on the restorative potential of peer review and publication,
federal judges seem to have overlooked the variety of influences and the
number of conflicts of interest and non-disclosures in the mainstream
medical and scientific literatures. 10 2 Here, we can expand our introductory sociological assessment in ways bearing more directly on modern
3
product liability and tort litigation.10
a.

(Undisclosed) Conflicts of Interest
When an investigator has a financial interest in or funding
by a company with activities related to his or her research, the
research is lower in quality, more likely to favor the sponsor's
product, less likely to be published, and more likely to have
delayed publication.
Catherine DeAngelis, Editor, Journal of the American Medical
Association (2000) .104

In the discussion of "Objectivity" we gained some sense of how many
scientists working on government advisory committees had conflicts of interest. Now we turn to consider how some of these close relations with
industry impact the medical literature. Once again, recent studies and the
need for continuing editorial interventions do not engender confidence.
A study by Krimsky, Rothenberg, Stott and Kyle, of articles published
in "fourteen preeminent" medical journals in 1996, found that one-third
of the articles they examined featured a lead author with some kind of
102. See Marcia Angell et al., Is Academic Medicine for Sale?, 342 NEw ENG. J.
1516 (2000); Catherine D. DeAngelis et al., Reporting Financial Conflicts of
Interest and Relationships Between Investigators and Research Sponsors, 286 JAMA 89
(2001); Jeffrey M. Drazen & Gregory D. Curfman, FinancialAssociations of Authors,
346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1901 (2002); David Korn, Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical
Research, 284 JAMA 2234 (2000); Dennis F. Thompson, UnderstandingFinancial
Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 573 (1993). The journal NATURE was the
last of the prestigious scientific and medical journals to institute an author disclosure policy. Compare Philip Campbell, Declarationof FinancialInterests: Introducing a
New Policy for Authors of Research Papers in Nature and Nature journals, 412 NATURE
751 (2001), with K.J. Rothman, Conflicts of Interest. The New McCarthyism in Science.,
269 JAMA 2782 (1993).
103. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Defending Clean Science from Dirty Attacks by Special Interests, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION
OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, supra note 96, at 25.
104. Catherine D. DeAngelis, Conflict of Interest and the Public Trust, 284 JAMA
2237, 2238 (2000).
MED.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 6

VILIANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52: p. 857

undisclosed conflict of interest. 10 5 The conflicts they considered included
holding an executive position or substantial stock in a company whose
products were related to the publication; serving on the board of such a
company; or holding or applying for a patent for an invention closely related to the research. These figures, as Krimsky et al. report, are probably
conservative because of the difficulties identifying financial relations and
the reluctance of many conflicted scientists to publicly acknowledge sponsorships and consulting arrangements.
Meta-analyses of published medical and scientific literatures also suggest that research funding is strongly correlated to research outcomes.
Studies funded by for-profit corporations on their new drugs and therapies tend to favor the new treatments over traditional and existing drugs
and therapies.10 6 In a review of articles on psychiatry, orthopedics and
cardiology published in the British MedicalJournalbetween 1997 and 2001,
research sponsored by for-profit corporations was significantly more positive toward experimental and novel interventions than trials conducted by
those without private sponsorship. 10 7 One study, of 107 controlled
clinical trials by Davidson, identified a statistically significant association
between private sponsorship and support for new therapies. 10 8 Among
those trials which supported existing therapies, Davidson found that only
thirteen percent were supported by drug manufacturers whereas eightyseven percent emerged from research sponsored by universities and other
not-for-profit institutions. 10 9 Support for novel therapies seems to be
closely tied to private commercial interests and intellectual property
rights.
These findings are confirmed by reviews of safety and efficacy research. In their review of toxicological research on bisphenol A-a substance used in many plastics-vom Saal and Hughes found that of the 115
studies they examined, none of the eleven studies sponsored by for-profit

105. See Krimsky et al., FinancialInterests of Authors in ScientificJournals:A Pilot
Study of 14 Publications, 2 Sci. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 395 (1996); Sheldon Krimsky
& L.S. Rothenberg, FinancialInterest and its Disclosure in Scientific Publications,280
JAMA 225 (1998);Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of FinancialConflicts of
Interest in Biomedical Research, 289 JAMA 454 (2003).
106. See Nassir A. Azimi & H. Gilbert Welch, The Effectiveness of Cost-effectiveness

Analysis in Containing Costs, 13J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 664 (1998).
107. See Lise L. Kjaergard & Bodil Als-Nielsen, Association Between Competing
Interests and Authors' Conclusions: Epidemiological Study of Randomized Clinical Trials
Published in the BMJ, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 249 (2002). Interestingly, the authors of a

similar study suggested that the results might be due to study design:
"[P]referential support was given to trials that had a greater chance of favoring
one intervention over another." Benjamin Djulbegovic et al., The Uncertainty Principle and Industry-Sponsored Research, 356 LANCET 635-38 (2000).
108. See Richard A. Davidson, Source of Fundingand Outcome of Clinical Trials, 1

J.

GEN. INTERNAL MED.

155 (1986).

109. See id.
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corporations reported adverse effects at low exposures. 110 In contrast,
ninety-four of the 104 studies funded from public sources reported adverse effects at extremely low levels."' Friedman and Richter reported
that authors with financial interests in drug trials were ten to twenty times
less likely to present negative findings than those without financial interests.11 2 A study by Freidberg et al. concluded that "pharmaceutical sponsorship of economic analyses [of drugs] is associated with reduced
likelihood of reporting unfavorable results."' 13 Other studies support
these findings, identifying strong associations between published opinions
about the safety, efficacy and cost-effectiveness of pharmaceuticals
and
14
therapeutics and financial relationships with the manufacturers.'
Overall, recent studies suggest that sponsored research is somewhere
between four to eight times more likely to favor the sponsor's product or
interests than research funded from public sources. Companies, and here
it is important to emphasize that we are not referring exclusively to the
tobacco and asbestos industries, routinely encourage and actively facilitate
research which will help with the marketing of their products as well as
15
prevent (or help with the defense in) future litigation.'
Conflicts of interest related to sponsorship and other commercial relations are endemic in scientific medicine. Moreover, all of the research
suggests that sponsorship and commercial interests shape the content of
scientific knowledge and the published record. Barnes and Bero concluded their assessment of medical review articles as follows:
The conclusion of a review article may be suspect whenever the
author has a financial interest in the outcome of the review.
Therefore, our findings suggest that the authors should disclose
their affiliations, source of funding, and other potential financial
110. See Frederick S. vom Saal & Clause Hughes, An Extensive New Literature
Concerning Low-Level Dose Effects of Bisphenol A Shows the Need for a New Risk Assessment, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERsp. 926 (2005).
111. See id.
112. See Lee S. Friedman & Elihu D. Richter, Relationship Between Conflicts of
Interest and Research Results, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 51 (2004).
113. Mark Friedberg et al., Evaluation of Conflict of Interest in Economic Analyses
of New Drugs Used in Oncology, 282 JAMA 1453 (1999).
114. See Mohit Bhandari et al., Association Between Industry Funding and Statistically Significant Pro-Industry Findings in Medical and Surgical Randomized Trials, 170
CANADIAN MED. Ass'N J. 477 (2004); An-Wen Chan & Douglas G. Altman, Identifying Outcome Reporting Bias in Randomised Trials on PubMed: Review of Publications and
Survey of Authors, 330 BRIT. MED. J. 753 (2005); Drummond Rennie, Thyroid Storm,
277JAMA 1238 (1997); P.A. Rochon et al., A Study of Manufacturer-SupportedTrials
of Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs in the Treatment of Arthritis, 154 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MED. 157 (1994); Henry Thomas Stelfox et al., Conflict of Interest in the
Debate over Calcium-ChannelAntagonists, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101 (1998).
115. See KRIMSKy, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST, supra note 84, at 153-54
(2003); Deborah E. Barnes & Lisa A. Bero, Why Review Articles on the Health Effects of
Passive Smoking Reach Different Conclusions, 279 JAMA 1566 (1998); see also DAN FAGIN & MARIANNE LAVELLE, Toxic DECEPrION (1996).
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conflicts of interest, and that readers should consider these disclosures when deciding how to judge an article's conclusions.1 16
A recent review of 1,396 high-impact science and medical journals
found that only 15.8% had a published policy on conflict of interest information in 1997.117 (It is useful to remember that this is the very decade
when the Supreme Court was consolidating the (admissibility) revolution
against plaintiffs.) About one-third ofjournals request conflict of interest
information from peer reviewers and about half require it from their editors. On the basis of their investigations, Krimsky and Rothenberg determined that less than one percent of the articles published in the 1,396
different journals featured any positive disclosure of personal financial interest by a contributor. These figures suggest that even in those instances
where science and medical journals actually have policies there would
seem to be extraordinarily low levels of compliance and little, if any, enforcement. Many of the conflicts of interests, sponsorships and funding
arrangements seem to endure without disclosure. One study of corporate
support for biotechnology published in 1984 estimated that even by that
11 8
stage one quarter of research funding was already private.
The prevalence of industry-university collaborations and conflicts of
interest more generally leads Krimsky to the following conclusion:
Conflicts of interest have been linked to research bias as well as
the loss of a socially valuable ethical norm-disinterestednessamong academic researchers. As universities turn their scientific
laboratories into commercial enterprise zones and as they select
their faculty to realize these goals, fewer opportunities will exist
in academia for public interest science-an inestimable loss to
society.119
This interpretation might be considered troubling for judges looking
to litigation-free science-especially the scientific and medical literatures
and university departments-for independence and reliability.
b.

Secrecy Agreements and Suppression

In recent years there has been growing concern about for-profit companies funding research with restrictivecovenants. These covenants are con116. See Barnes & Bero, supra note 115, at 1570.
117. See Sheldon Krimsky and L.S. Rothenberg, Conflict of Interest in Science and

MedicalJournals:EditorialPracticesand Author Disclosures,7 Sci. & ENGINEERING ETHics 205, 210 (2001). The medical journals were the journals with the highest number of COI policies in place. See id.
118. David Blumenthal et al., IndustrialSupport of University Research in Biotechnology, 231 Sci. 242 (1986); see also Eric Campbell et al., Looking a Gift Horse in the
Mouth: Corporate Gifts Supporting Life Sciences Research, 279 JAMA 995 (1998).
119. KRjMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST, supra note 84, at 75-79 (defining "public interest science" as research addressing "issues that elude a market
solution").
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tracts which provide researchers with access to drugs, patients and data on
condition that the sponsoring organization may withhold results or delay
their wider dissemination. There have been instances where scientists
whose findings were adverse (to the sponsoring company's economic interests) were threatened with breach of contract for going public. This
includes circumstances where preliminary findings suggested that therapies were dangerous, associated with increased risk or physical injury, did
not seem to be effective and the research scientists had legal obligations to
notify regulators.
Corporations have an unenviable record of challenging adverse findings, including findings produced by researchers contracted to them. In
many cases these challenges are ad hominem and create considerable difficulties for scientists and their institutions. Notorious instances, like the
cases of Tyrone Hayes at Berkeley, Betty Dong at the University of California, San Francisco and Nancy Olivieri at the University of Toronto, provide instructive lessons for researchers contemplating publicizing results
which raise doubts about the safety or efficacy of profitable pharmaceuticals.1 20 Restrictive covenants and industry attacks may inhibit research or
discourage those interested in undertaking research on issues pertinent to
public health.
The suppression of results is a major problem, especially when so
much public health research is sponsored or undertaken by private, forprofit corporations.' 2 1 Research contracts may entitle a sponsor to discontinue studies or withdraw support on the basis of unfavorable preliminary
results. Those sponsoring research can avoid the appearance of outright
fraud by aborting studies or identifying methodological flaws which are
used to suggest that undesirable results are suspect on technical grounds.
Corporations, and their scientists, can be very skeptical when it suits their
interests.
In 2004, the Canadian Medical AssociationJournal reported that one of

the world's largest pharmaceutical manufacturers (GlaxoSmithKline) had
withheld, since 1998, trial results suggesting that one of its antidepressants
(Paxil) offered no benefits to adolescents. A company memorandum, discovered during the preparatory stages of litigation, provided the explana120. Dong is discussed in KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRiVATE INTEREST, supra
note 84, at 14-18. Hayes is discussed in Sheldon Krimsky, Autonomy, Disinterest, and
EntrepreneurialScience, 43 Soc'Y 22, 25 (2006). Dong's contract with Flint Laboratories (subsequently acquired by Knoll) for research on Synthroid included details of
experimental design and data analysis and contained the following clause:
All information contained in this protocol is confidential and is to be
used by the investigator only for the conduct of this study. Data obtained
by the investigator while carrying out this study is also considered confidential and is not to be published or otherwise released without written
consent from Flint Laboratories.
Krimsky, PublicationBias, supra note 96, at 69.
121. See Robert Steinbrook, Gag Clauses in Clinical-TrialAgreements, 352 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2160 (2005).
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tion for the suppression: "It would be commercially unacceptable to
include a statement that efficacy had not been demonstrated .... 1,22
Companies have a tendency to withhold results or challenge findings
which are not in their commercial interests. 123 Litigation, in contrast, offers the possibility to bring conflicts of interest, sponsorship and otherwise
secret arrangements and knowledge into the public domain.
c.

Ghost Writing

Although not a new phenomenon, in recent decades it has become
increasingly common for product manufacturers, like Pharma, to pay eminent scientists to attach their name and imprimatur to studies undertaken
and written by others. Sometimes the scientists engaged do not even have
access to the study protocols or the primary data. Draft papers tend to be
prepared by company employees or those contracted to a company. Once
again, and for reasons which are self-evident, these arrangements tend to
24
be suppressed.'
One survey of 809 articles published across six medical journals in
1996 found that eleven percent (or ninety-three) were ghost-authored.
125
Nineteen percent featured an honorary author.

d.

Studies Designed to Confound

Another concern is that for-profit corporations fund research which is
unlikely to achieve decisive results. Rather than make serious contributions to "knowledge," some research is pursued for its regulatory and legal
potential (to confound). Even in areas with established protocols there is
often sufficient interpretive flexibility around test subjects, laboratory conditions, duration, reporting requirements and the treatment of "anoma126
lies" to generate favorable, or less unfavorable, interpretations.
Sometimes studies are organized so that, notwithstanding appearances, researchers are not actually comparing drugs or therapies under similar conditions. 127 A review of the literature by Bekelman et al. found that
122. Wayne Krondo & Barbara Sibbald, Drug Company Experts Advised Staff to
Withhold Data about SSRI Use in Children, 170 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 783 (2004).
123. SeeJini Hetherington et al., Retrospective and ProspectiveIdentification of Unpublished Controlled Trials: Lessons from a Survey of Obstetricians and Pediatricians,84
PEDIATRICS 374 (1989).
124. See SHELDON

RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER,

TRUST Us, WE'RE EXPERTS

(2001).
125. See Annette Flanagin et al., Prevalence of Articles with Honorary Authors and
Ghost Authors in Peer-Reviewed MedicalJournals,280 JAMA 222 (1998).
126. See Lisa Bero & Drummond Rennie, Influences on the Quality of Published
Drug Studies, 12 INT. J. TECH. ASSESS. & HEALTH CARE 209 (1996); Thomas
Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the PharmaceuticalIndustry,
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539 (2000).
127. See W.J. Assendelft et al., The Relationship Between Methodological Quality
and Conclusions of Reviews of Spinal Manipulation, 274 JAMA 1942 (1995); Helle
Johanesen & Peter Gotzsche, Problems in the Design and Reporting of Trials of Antifun-
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industry-sponsored studies were more likely to use inappropriate comparisons and inactive controls than publicly funded studies. 128
Perhaps it is ironic, given the reduction in civil litigation caused by
more demanding admissibility standards, that the discovery attending litigation has provided some of the clearest indications of the manipulation
of study protocols (i.e. design tweaking). Consider the following example
of sponsored research which surfaced in litigation over the safety of silicone-breast implants.
According to documents introduced into the litigation, one company [Dow Corning] funded research that was designed to maximize the probability that silicone implants would not be found to
cause a disease. The company established four conditions before
it would award funds for the research. These conditions were
viewed by the plaintiffs' lawyers as biasing the outcome of studies
against the claims of their clients.
The conditions are as follows: First, studies should look at
traditional connective tissue diseases and not the atypical symptoms reported by clinicians in the literature. Second, studies
should include saline as well as silicone implants. Assuming the
saline implants were not a problem, they would dilute the cases
of concern, reducing the possibility of obtaining a statistically significant finding that silicone caused disease. Third, the studies
should use a test of significance (two tailed) that considered both
the positive and negative impacts of having silicone-breast implants, even though there were no hypotheses that silicone implants improved women's health. Fourth, all women who
exhibited symptoms after 1991 should be excluded from the
study. This exclusion kept the mean "years with implant" to between seven and nine, although some experts believe it can take
129
ten or more years for symptoms to develop.
Other documents revealed that Dow Corning Corporation persuaded
medical researchers at Johns Hopkins to modify the protocols used to
130
study the health effects of breast implants.

gal Agents Encountered DuringMeta-Analysis, 282 JAMA 1752 (1999); G.M. Swaen &
J.M. Meijers, Influence of Design Characteristicson the Outcome of Retrospective Cohort
Studies, 45 BRIT. J. INDUST. MED. 624 (1988).
128. See Bekelman et al., supra note 105, at 458.
129. KRiMSKy, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST, supra note 84, at 156-57.
130. See Katherine Squibb, Basic Science at Risk: Protecting the Independence of
Research, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, supra note 96, at 54-58; Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor, Introductionto RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, supra note 96, at 15.
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Qualifications, Caveats, Emphases and Omissions

In recent years, in response to problems associated with litigation, there
is evidence thatjournal editors (and their lawyers) have encouraged those
submitting papers on issues relevant to public health to moderate their
findings and conclusions. This is not unusual where findings are adverse
to consumer products, particularly products manufactured by those companies that advertise in or sponsor the journal.
A study of the interpretative statements included with epidemiological publications-the kinds of evidence typically preferred by federal
judges in tort and product liability cases-suggests that authors routinely
moderate their findings. 131 Moreover, it is not uncommon for editors to
give advance notice about adverse research to pharmaceutical manufacturers and for these companies to correspond prior to publication. Often
correspondence about the precise wording of pending publications is
managed by company lawyers. Perhaps against expectations, adverse findings and potential risks are more likely to be underestimated or represented conservatively than overstated.
Caveats and tempered conclusions tend to operate against the public
interest and against those burdened with proof in litigation. Studies with
ambivalent or less certain results are a valuable resource for corporate defendants where plaintiffs are burdened with proving causation. Not content with requiring plaintiffs to produce medical evidence to explain the
cause of their injury or loss, several federal circuits formally require published epidemiological studies with statistically significant results to support causation in toxic tort cases. 132 This is an incredibly onerous impost
which is compounded by the placement of uncertain, ambiguous or quali133
fied studies in the published medical literature.
Emphases, omissions and other choices can also create difficulties or
mislead. The following passage indicates how emphases and omissions in
the reporting of research may foster misleading-i.e. situationally advantageous-impressions:
One does not have to manipulate data or use invalid methods
tantamount to fraud to bias a scientific paper. The omission of
the citation of contrary data and studies is very difficult to pick
up in the process of peer revieW. There is considerable leeway
within acceptable choices to investigate, interpret, and present
data-and cite other studies . . . Intentional bias in choices of
131. See David Rier, The Versatile "Caveat" Section of an Epidemiology Paper, 21
Sci. COMM. 3 (1997).
132. See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167 (5th

Cir. 1987).
133. See Brian L. Campbell, Uncertainty as Symbolic Action in Disputes Among Experts, 15 Soc. STUD. Sci. 429 (1985).
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methodology, data, and styles of interpretation within well-accepted limits are well-nigh impossible to detect or prove.13
Ashford's comments indicate how those with conscious or unconscious biases or disclosed or undisclosed interests may exaggerate the safety and
efficacy of drugs, chemicals and therapeutics without engaging in behavior
that would be derided as fraud or widely perceived as methodologically
improper. The propriety of particular methods, interpretations, emphases
and omissions, individually and in combination, can "fly under the radar"
of reviewers, editors and more remote audiences.
f. Redundancy, Retraction and Correction
Favorable sponsored research-that is, research perceived as
favorable to a sponsor-is sometimes cosmetically altered and re-published to create the impression that there are multiple studies which independently arrived at similar (and always favorable) conclusions.1 5 This,
again, impacts adversely on plaintiffs because the record suggests that products are safer or more efficacious than is known to be the case. In one
study of redundant publications the authors found that "inclusion of these
duplicate data led to a twenty-three percent overestimation of the efficiency of" the drug.' 3 6 Perhaps as serious, the re-publication of favorable
sponsored studies contributes to a false impression of corporate responsibility and concern with public health and safety.
On the subject of correction, studies suggest that journals are not
only generally delinquent in this regard, but encounter practical difficulties repairing published literatures retrospectively. Publications demonstrated to be incorrect or fraudulent often receive little if any response,
even in the journal where they were originally published. As Collins's
study of physicists suggests, the scientific literature-and this extends to
published studies known to be fraudulent or implausible-is open to
many inconsistent readings.
g.

Institutional Responses: The Medical Journals Fight Back
We editors of medical journals worry that we sometimes publish
studies where the declared authors have not participated in the
design of the study, had no access to the raw data, and had little
to do with the interpretation of the data. Instead the sponsors of

134. Nicholas Ashford, Disclosure of Interests: A Time for Clarity, 28 AM.J. INDUS.
611 (1995).
135. See Peter G0tzsche, Multiple Publication of Reports of Drug Trials, 36 EUR. J.
CLINICAL PHIARMACOLOGY 429 (1989); Patricia Huston & David Moher, Redundancy,
Disaggregation,and the Integrity of Medical Research, 347 LANCET 1024 (1996); Martin
R. Traym&r et al., Impact of Covert DuplicatePublication on Meta-Analysis: A Case Study,
315 BRIT. MED. J. 635 (1997).
136. See Drummond Rennie, Fair Conduct and Fair Reporting of Clinical Trials,
282JAMA 1766, 1766 (1999).
MED.
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the study-often pharmaceutical companies-have designed the
study and analysed and interpreted the data. Readers and editors
[and here we could include judges] are thus being deceived. Editors are also concerned that the declared authors might not have
ultimate control over whether studies are published. That decision may rest with the funders of the research-perhaps a government department or a pharmaceutical company-which
could mean that results unfavourable to the funders are suppressed. This distorts the scientific record and again deceives
readers, allowing them to read only favourable results. Editors
have taken steps to counter the problem by revising the uniform
requirements for manuscripts submitted to biomedical journals
of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, and
changing editorial practices.
Richard Smith, Editor, British MedicalJournal (2001).'137
Just in case the previous examples are thought to be unrepresentative
or exaggerated, and to provide the reader with some sense of institutional
responses to problems with the medical literature, the actions of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE or "the Committee") provide an instructive example.
The ICMJE is composed of editors from the leading medical journals.
Members include the New EnglandJournalof Medicine (NEJM);Journalof the
American Medical Association (JAMA); British Medical Journal (BMJ); Lancet,
Canadian Medical Association Journal; Annals of Internal Medicine, Medical
Journal of Australia; Journal of the Danish Medical Association (Ugeskrift for

Laeger) and the Dutch Medical Journal (Nederlands Tijdschrift voor
Geneeskunde). Initially working under the title of the "Vancouver
Group," members of the ICMJE have been developing guidelines for submissions to biomedical journals since 1978. Over the last decade, however, the Committee has expanded its remit, developing a number of
"Separate Statements" on editorial policy, and in the last few years, consolidating its work. A more comprehensive guide is now published as the
Uniform Requirementsfor Manuscripts Submitted to BiomedicalJournals:Writing
and Editing for Biomedical Publication (2005) ("the Uniform Requirements").

For our purposes the ICMJE's work on conflicts of interest, disclosure and
trial registration is of particular interest.
The extract from the British MedicalJournalreproduced at the beginning of this sub-section suggests concern about conflicts of interest and
suggests that the deliberate contamination of the medical literature is
ubiquitous and has encouraged vigorous responses from aggrieved edi137. Richard Smith, Maintainingthe Integrity of the Scientific Record: Editors Make
a Move, 323 BRIT. MED. J. 588 (2001). Smith took pains to make clear that this was

not "an attack on the pharmaceutical industry. Almost all new drugs are developed
by the industry, and many companies have high ethical standards and will see no
problem in complying with the new policies." See id.
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tors. In 1988 the ICMJE encouraged authors to identify financial relationships which might create conflicts of interest. 138 This position was
reinforced in 1993 when the Committee passed a resolution urging those
submitting manuscripts to acknowledge all financial support and financial
and personal interests associated with submissions. 139 In 2001, in response to surprisingly low numbers of disclosures, the Committee imposed
a new protocol that made disclosure of conflicts mandatory and encouraged other biomedical journals to follow its lead.
The new policy is set out in the Uniform Requirements. The ICMJE defines conflicts of interest broadly and insists that authors disclose any conflicts so that editors, peer reviewers and other readers might take them
into consideration when 'judging the manuscript":
Conflict of interest exists when an author (or the author's institution), reviewer, or editor has financial or personal relationships
that inappropriately influence (bias) his or her actions (such relationships are also known as dual commitments, competing interests, or competing loyalties). These relationships vary from
those with negligible potential to those with great potential to
influence judgment, and not all relationships represent true conflict of interest. The potential for conflict of interest can exist
whether or not an individual believes that the relationship affects
his or her scientific judgment. Financial relationships (such as
employment, consultancies, stock ownership, honoraria, paid expert testimony) are the most easily identifiable conflicts of interest and the most likely to undermine the credibility of the
journal, the authors, and of science itself. However, conflicts can
occur for other reasons, such as personal relationships, academic
competition, and intellectual passions.
All participants in the peer review and publication process must
disclose all relationships that could be viewed as presenting a potential conflict of interest. Disclosure of these relationships is also
important in connection with editorials and review articles, because it can be more difficult to detect bias in these types of publication than in reports of original research. Editors may use
information disclosed in conflict of interest and financial interest
statements as a basis for editorial decisions. Editors should publish this information if they believe it is important in judging the
manuscript.

138. G.D. Lundberg & A. Flanagin, New Requirements for Authors: Signed Statements of Authorship Responsibility and FinancialDisclosure, 262 JAMA 2003 (1989).
139. See International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, Conflict of Interest, 341 LANCET 742 (1993).
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When authors submit a manuscript, whether an article or a letter,
they are responsible for disclosing all financial and personal relationships that might bias their work. To prevent ambiguity, authors must state explicitly whether potential conflicts do or do
not exist.

1 40

Although now mandatory, the success of disclosure and the extent of compliance is uncertain. Journals, like end users, are not well-positioned to
make assessments about compliance or unilaterally identify private financial arrangements between scientists and corporate sponsors.
Limitations with disclosure and its relative weakness have encouraged
more drastic actions. In 1994, for example, the NEJM introduced a new
policy on the publication of "cost-effectiveness analyses." Analyses about
the relative cost-effectiveness of different treatments were so dependent
upon potentially biased assumptions and values that:
They will not be excluded from consideration if they are supported by a grant from industry to a non-profit institution, but
like review articles they will be excluded from consideration if
any of their authors has a personal financial conflict of interest.
Simply disclosing such conflicts of interest, as others have sug141
gested authors do, will not suffice.
For cost-effective analyses and review articles, even the disclosure of financial interests was considered by the editorial staff of the NEJM to be an
inadequate safeguard.
More recently, the ICMJE has extended its program of reforms by
calling for the prospective registration of all clinical trials. Formal registration is intended to reduce suppression, redundancy, exaggeration and
142
fraud as well as produce a comprehensive, publicly accessible database.
140. See International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to BiomedicalJournals: Writing and Editingfor Biomedical Publication§II.D (2005), available at www.ICMJE.org (last visited December 19,
2006) [hereinafter ICMJE, Uniform Requirements]; Sheldon Krimsky, Small Gifts,
Conflicts of Interest, and the Zero-Tolerance Threshold in Medicine, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICs 50
(2003). Notably Krimsky concludes his paper with the following: "There are perhaps some institutions whose fiduciary duty responsibility to the public is of such
importance that it makes sense to establish a zero-tolerance for gifts of any value.
These might include journalists, judges, professors, and physicians." Id. at 51. We
might want to reflect on sponsored judicial education and conferences for judges
and lawyers..
141. Jerome P. Kassirer & Marcia Angell, The Journal'sPolicy on Cost-Effectiveness
Analyses, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 669, 670 (1994). The New England Journal of
Medicine required that industry grants be provided to organizations rather than
individual scientists; written assurance that the scientists were independent; and
the manuscript to include all data and all assumptions. See id. at 670-71; see also
Chaim M. Bell et al., Bias in Published Cost Effectiveness Studies: Systematic Review, 332
BRIT. MED. J. 699 (2006).
142. See Kay Dickersin, Why Register Clinical Trials: Revisited, 13 CONTROLLED
CLINICAL TRIALS 170 (1992); Richard Horton & Richard Smith, Time to Register Randomized Trials, 354 LANCET 1138 (1999).
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The Committee now requires clinical trials to be registered on a public
database before they will even consider publishing trial results: "The
ICMJE member journals will require, as a condition of consideration for
143
publication in their journals, registration in a public trials registry."
The Committee explained the reasoning behind this requirement: "If all
trials are registered in a public repository at their inception, every trial's
existence is part of the public record and the many stakeholders in clinical
144
research can explore the full range of clinical evidence.
The Uniform Requirements list the necessary data elements and recommend that trial registration numbers be published at the end of article
abstracts. Again, the Committee encourages the editors of other biomedical journals to adopt a similar policy. Registrations, as the Committee and
several commentators recognize, will not resolve many difficult issues such
as the kinds and stages at which trials should be registered; the kinds of
information to include; the format of the information and the temporal
relationship between a trial and registration; how to determine what
counts as genuine compliance; how those accessing the data can ascertain
the quality of the study and the statistical analysis; how the various results
should be included in meta-analyses; how non-published results ought to
be treated, and so on. Nevertheless, like the policies on conflicts of interest, the Committee's actions demonstrate a concerted attempt to identify
and manage the impact of private sponsorship on scientific and medical
publication.
These, of course, are not the only subjects on which the Committee
has developed guidelines. Other policies include the call to "consider seriously for publication" any "study of an important question ... where the
results are negative (that is, convincingly allow the null hypothesis to be
145
accepted) or positive (that is, allow the null hypothesis to be rejected)."
Failure to publish negative studies contributes to "publication bias." The
Committee explains: "Many studies that purport to be negative are, in fact,
inconclusive; publication of inconclusive studies is problematic, since they
1 46
add little to biomedical knowledge and consume journal resources.'
The Uniform Requirements also detail policies on "Corrections, Retractions and 'Expressions of Concern,"' "Redundant Publication," "Advertis143. ICMJE, Uniform Requirements, supra note 140, at §IIIJ.
144. Catherine De Angelis et al., Clinical Trial Registration:A Statement from the
International Committee of MedicalJournalEditors, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1250, 125051 (2004). The ICMJE states:
The ICMJE does not advocate one particular registry, but its member
journals will require authors to register their trial in a registry that meets
several criteria. The registry must be accessible to the public at no charge.
It must be open to all prospective registrants and managed by a not-forprofit organization. There must be a mechanism to ensure the validity of
the registration data, and the registry should be electronically searchable.
ICMJE, Uniform Requirements, supra note 140, at §IIIJ.
145. See id. at §III.A.
146. See id.
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ing" and "Supplements, Theme Issues and Special Series." Given federal
admissibility jurisprudence over the last two decades the Uniform Requirements should be required reading for judges.
h.

Overview

Upon closer examination, peer review and publication-the very
benchmark(s) federal judges hoped to use to rehabilitate dependent scientific knowledge, including scientific knowledge that was purposive or encumbered with limitations-do not seem to guarantee reliability. Rather,
the medical and scientific literatures appear to be contaminatedwith purposive research designed to help chemical companies, oil producers, and
pharmaceutical and other manufacturers market their products, secure
regulatory compliance and resist liability. These efforts would seem to
epitomize science for litigation. They provide some indication of the sophistication, planning and resources devoted to scientific research and
strategic publication. They are also suggestive of duplicity and hypocrisy.
At the same time they were submitting amicus curiae briefs decrying lax
admissibility standards and demanding that courts require plaintiffs to
produce objective and independent expert evidence, for-profit corpora147
tions were actively sponsoring and tailoring research.
In the very years when judges were searching for extrinsic epistemic
anchor points-like publication in peer-reviewed journals-the editors of
scientific and medical journals were reforming editorial policies in order
to improve the reliability of their publications. Interestingly, scientific
journals have been drawing upon traditional legal and administrative
147. In this context consider the image of science included in an amicus curiae
brief submitted in the Daubertappeal to the Supreme Court on behalf of the Product Liability Advisory Council (PLAC), the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM) and the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA):
The scientific method speaks to the process by which scientists reached a
conclusion .... In particular, the scientific method requires that one (1)
first set forth a hypothesis, (2) design an experiment, or more properly a
set of experiments, to test the hypothesis, (3) conduct the experiment,
collect the data, and then analyze those data, (4) publish the results so
that the may add not only to the body of knowledge, but also be subject
to external scrutiny, and (5) ensure that those results are replicable and
verifiable ....When attempting to draw scientific conclusions, whether at
the laboratory bench or the courtroom bar, one should at a minimum be
required to formulate those conclusions in accord with the scientific
method. That method provides a straightforward, relatively simple, and
reasonable test for the admissibility of expert opinion. It is a test, moreover, which federal judges can readily apply ....
Brief of Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 16-17, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
(No. 92-102).
Many large for-profit organizations and collectives have aggressively championed
commercially advantageous reform to regulatory and legal practice based on
images of scientific practice which bear little resemblance to the kinds of strategic
research they routinely undertake and sponsor. See Edmond, Just Truth, supra note
4.
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tools. The editors of scientific and medical journals have not been calling
for enhanced peer review or methodological assessments based on the
work of archaic philosophers like Popper. Instead, they have emphasized
the need to disclose conflicts of interest, funding arrangements and consultancies in order to make the origins and orientations of the published
research more transparent. Professional scientific recourse to disclosure
and registration betrays the weakness of the scientific method and the
limitations of peer review. Insights like these should breach the confidence with which judges, like Kozinski and Blackmun, approach the published medical (and scientific) literature. It might be unsettling but
corporate sponsored science-that is, science for marketing, regulation and
litigation-tends to be oriented to future uses in ways where the orientation may be embedded, subtle or deliberately covert. The underhanded
and clandestine nature of much of the sponsorship might itself be considered revealing.
Given the work of sociologists of science, in conjunction with the sustained intervention of many of the world's preeminent medical editors,
where, we might wonder, is the jurisprudence tempering the Daubert criteria, science for litigation or the implications of reforms to medical publication for plaintiffs and the viability of tort and product liability? Where is
the discussion (or supplementation) of the qualifications perfunctorily included with the celebration of publication and peer review in Daubert in
the Supreme Court and on remand to the Ninth Circuit? Where are the
limitations with peer review and publication seriously considered or applied by federal judges? Where are the judicial expressions of skepticism
or concerns about research sponsored by corporations? And, why are federal judges more trusting of methods and norms and their remedial potential than the technically proficient editors of the New EnglandJournal of
Medicine, the Journal of the American Medical Association, the British Medical
Journaland the Lancet?
F.

Demarcation Difficulties

Philosophers, sociologists and scientists have been unable to identify
or develop criteria which can be consistently operationalized to distinguish between the scientific, the non-scientific and the pseudo-scientific.
Arguably, no such criteria exist.
According to Popper's student, Lakatos: "Is, then, Popper's falsifiability criterion the solution to the problem of demarcating science
from pseudoscience? No. For Popper's criterion ignores the remarkable
tenacity of scientific theories. Scientists have thick skins. They do not abandon a theory merely because facts contradict it."1 4 8 Lakatos was unimpressed with falsification as a tool for practical demarcation and
recognized that scientists (and natural philosophers) routinely main-

148. Imr6 Lakatos, Science and Pseudoscience, in PHILOSOPHY
23 (Martin Curd &J.A. Cover eds., 1998).

OF SCIENCE: THE

CENTRAL ISSUES
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tain(ed) theoretical commitments in the face of inconsistent evidencethat is, recalcitrant "facts."
The philosopher Laudan summarized the search for a demarcation
criterion as follows: "The quest for a specifically scientific form of knowledge, or for a demarcation criterion between science and non-science, has
been an unqualified failure. There is apparently no epistemic feature or
set of such features which all and only the 'sciences' exhibit." 149 In consequence, the boundaries around classifications like "science," "pseudo-sci1 50
ence" and 'junk science" become indistinct and potentially porous.
Indeed, the boundaries used to distinguish between the sciences and to
demarcate scientific from non-scientific activity, seem more comprehensi15 1
ble when understood as flexible, strategically manipulated and political.
If we momentarily turn our attention to the concept junk science, we
can begin to appreciate that it is more of a polemical tool than an analytical one. Many of those who use the term may not encounter difficulties
identifying what they believe to be 'junk science," but things become more
complicated when it comes to credibly distinguishing so called junk science from authentic scientific knowledge on the basis of consistent application of some preferred demarcation criteria. 152 Often the process of
classification (or demarcation) seems to incorporate overt ideological
commitments rather than practical, technical or methodological distinctions. 153 It might not be considered coincidental that the individual most
responsible for popularizing the term 'junk science" (more below) relies
heavily on simplistic models of scientific method, scientific norms, peer
review and publication.
149. Larry Laudan, A Problem-Solving Approach to Scientific Progress, in BEYOND
77, 86 (Larry Laudan
ed., 1996); Larry Laudan, The Demise of the Demarcation Problem, in BUT Is IT SCIPOSITIVISM AND RELATIVISM: THEORY, METHOD AND EVIDENCE

ENCE? THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION IN THE CREATION/EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY

337 (M. Ruse ed., 1988).
150. Commentary on litigation over creation science and more recently intelligent design provides interesting reading. See Larry Laudan, Commentary on Ruse:
Science at the Bar-Causesfor Concern, in CREATIONISM, SCIENCE AND THE LAw: THE
ARKANSAS CASE (M. LaFollete ed., 1983); P. Quinn, The Philosopher of Science as Expert Witness, in SCIENCE AND REALITY: RECENT WORK IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
(J. Cushing et al. eds., 1984); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Creating (Public) Science in the Noah's Ark Case, 8 PUB. UNDERSTANDING Sci. 317 (1999). In addition,
see the collection of essays on Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist., No. 04cv2688,
2005 WL 578974, at *1 (M.D. Pa., Oct. 24, 2005), contained in 36 Soc. STUD. SCI.
819 (2006).
151. See GIERYN, supra note 79.
152. See PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991). Compare K. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber'sJunk Scholarship,42 AM.
U. L. REv. 1637 (1993), with Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing "Junk"Science,
1998 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (1998), and Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Juggling
Science: From Polemic to Pastiche, 13 Soc. EPISTEMOLOGY 215 (1999).
153. For an influential study of attempts to distinguish the study of parapsychology from the realm of legitimate science, see H. COLLINS & T. PINCH, FRAMES
OF MEANING (1982); see also G. BOWKER & S. STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
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We should not be deceived by apparently easy solutions to scientific
disagreement, uncertainty and risk. There are no simple or stable means
capable of distinguishing so-called good science from so-called bad science. Rather than getting mired in the distractions caused by pejorative
labels and allegations, we ought to be concerned with attempts to locate
expertise that is sufficiently reliable for legal decision-making as well as the
broader regulatory and distributive goals of our civil and criminal justice
systems.

1 54

G.

An Imaginary (Scientific) Community

It is difficult to identify a homogenous scientific community. Historically, scientists from different disciplines tended to interact infrequently
and, even within fields and sub-specializations, often relied on different
assumptions, equipment, practices, methods and heuristics. 155 The idea
of a community of scientists linked by practices, values or even a shared
ethos is not merely historically and sociologically illusive, but actually fictitious.

15 6

In reality there is no coherent scientific community, only a col-

lection of rather disparate sciences (in the plural). Once we lose the
universal method, and realize that norms are routinely contravened, it becomes increasingly difficult to locate shared features meaningfully linking
the many different activities we classify as sciences. Collins's study of gravitational physicists, discussed earlier, raises questions about where fields
and disciplinary boundaries start and stop as well as who should be consid57
ered to be a competent member of a field or community.1

H.

Recapitulation

Together, these insights transform knowledge production and modern forms of expertise-including the hardest sciences (e.g., physics,
chemistry, biology and even medicine)-into complex social activities
where what constitutes good science, along with reliability, images of objectiv-

ity, independence and purpose, are opened to contestation and become susceptible to investigation. Consequently, as a reflection of the modern
sciences and modern manifestations of expertise, the models of science
appearing in Daubert and subsequent judicial practice, like Kozinski's re154. See Gary Edmond, After Objectivity: Expert Evidence and ProceduralReform, 25
SYDNEY

L. REv. 131 (2003). Use of "reliable" only begs the question-how reliable?

Unfortunately, this is one of the elisions in the Daubert and Kumho decisions.
155. See BARRY BARNES, ABOUT SCIENCE
KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOCIAL PROBLEMS (1971).

(1985); JEROME RAVETZ,

SCIENTIFIC

156. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983).
157. See COLINS, GRAViTy's SHADow, supra note 98; H.M. Collins & Robert
Evans, The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience, 32 Soc.
STUD. Sci. 235 (2002); Alan Irwin, Expertise and Experience in the Governance of Science:
What is Public Participationfor?, in EXPERTISE IN REGULATION AND LAw, supranote 50,
at 32; MISUNDERSTANDING SCIENCE: THE PUBLIC RECONSTRUCTION OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY (Alan Irwin & Brian Wynne eds., 1996).
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course to science for litigation,would seem to be fundamentally and irreparably flawed.
There is a conspicuous gap between judicial descriptions of scientific
activity and the images of the sciences developed in more specialized
scholarly literatures. The significance of this gap may have been accentuated by the way senior judges explained changed admissibility conditions,
particularly the idea that they were facilitating convergence between the
laboratory and the courtroom. If, however, legal approaches to scientific evidence are empirically tenuous then some of the implications may be unintended or, what is more alarming, illegitimate. By adhering to
"mechanistic" formulations-like science for litigation and the Daubert crite-

ria-judges risk making determinations on the basis of highly artificial formulations with little relevance to either the historical sciences or
contemporary practice. 158 Some of these issues are perhaps most conspicuous in relation to reliance on one-dimensional impressions of peer review and publication and a reluctance to respond to widespread, if cynical
and corrosive, corporate (mis)conduct.
At this point I want to considerjust a few of the evidentiary and procedural implications arising from the use of sciencefor litigation. Now we can
observe how science for litigation and the Daubert criteria tend to be used

differentially. We will pay particular attention to how they assume their
hardest manifestation when applied to evidence adduced by plaintiffs and
criminal defendants.
IV.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF SCIENCE FOR LITIGATION

Apprised with a more empirically-grounded sense of the limitations of
idealized images of expertise and with renewed sensitivity to the way scientific research is embedded in the modern economy and strategically (and
often legitimately) oriented to legal and regulatory questions, in this section it is my intention to reconsider some of the implications attending the
adoption of science for litigation and the kinds of historically and sociologi-

cally impoverished images of science associated with Daubert. Exploring
the way (the concept) science for litigation is mobilized and put to work will
help us to understand some of its ideological functions.
A.

Civil (In)Justice: MarginalizingPlaintiffs and InsulatingDefendants

In civil litigation it is the plaintiff who bears the burden of proof and
needs to establish causation. What federal judges, like Kozinski, seem to
desire from plaintiffs is non-aligned scientific research which unambiguously supports their case. We can understand whyjudges would want conclusive, independent and uncontroversial research on which to base their
admissibility decisions and judgments, but where it is available this type of
158. See THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995).
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evidence encourages settlements, and generally favorable settlements,
rather than litigation.
The expectation that the plaintiff will produce expert evidence which
is independent of litigation, yet pertinent to the issues before a court, creates practical difficulties. If the relevant expert literature is not clear, if
research has not been undertaken or published, or if the findings do not
bear directly on the legal issues, what are plaintiffs to do? How are plaintiffs to obtain evidence that is independent of litigation or not-for-litigation? How can they ever escape the stigma associated with purposive
research, tailored evidence and partisan experts? An extremely important
question in this context is: Who is doing the kinds of research which federaljudges expect plaintiffs to produce? This question links legal practice,
the viability of product liability and tort law, to the organization and funding of modern scientific research. Are public institutions apprized of
these legal expectations when they make decisions about funding public
health research? For-profit corporations certainly are.
Even in those situations where there is research, published or otherwise, available to a plaintiff, it almost always requires adaptation, refinement, interpretation or meta-analysis. Where there is concern about
science for litigation, these processes introduce the possibility of judicial
cynicism, recrimination and the exclusion of evidence. Unless they rely
directly on the results of published studies-assuming they exist-plaintiffs
can always be criticized for tailoringtheir evidence and presenting implicitly unreliable science for litigation. This essay has endeavored to explain
that labels like "tailoring," "adaptation," "distortion" and "pre-litigation"
can be deceptive. Their popularity reveals much about contemporary judicial attitudes toward science and expertise and also toward plaintiffs and
lay juries.
In a striking contrast, civil defendants benefit from the pervasive belief that plaintiffs' expert evidence is a kind of partisan (or pathological)
knowledge. These beliefs are reflected in onerous admissibility standards
and pre-trial determinations (e.g., Daubert hearings) which do not require
civil defendants to present their evidence. Typically, defendants have far
greater resources-economic, institutional, legal, scientific, political and
public relations-than plaintiffs. Defendants are frequently experienced
litigants ("repeat players" in Galanter's terminology) with considerable
control over (the possibility of) research and information related to their
products. 159 Significantly, much of this information may be confidential
(and remain undisclosed). Moreover, judicial confidence in research undertaken before litigation, along with the remedial power of publication,
allows defendants to rely upon their in-house and sponsored research with
relative impunity. Compliance research and sponsored research which
merely pre-dates a legal claim or is not undertaken by a defendant corpo159. See M. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y Ruv. 95 (1974).
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ration's employees is frequently treated as not-for-litigation or
independent.
While it is rarely described in this way, there can be little doubt that
modern corporations produce and sponsor science for litigation and strategically tailor their expert evidence on those occasions when plaintiffs'
evidence overcomes the admissibility hurdles (and offers of settlement) to
force ajury trial. When you start to think about it, sharp divisions between
in-house and sponsored research undertaken by large corporations habituated to potential tort, contract and product liability suits, on the one
hand, and plaintiffs' research or reviews assembled to support pending
litigation, on the other, start to break down. Drawing upon mythical,
though no doubt appealing, images of expertise, judges have developed
standards which tend to insulate (and therefore privilege) the litigationoriented dimensions of research sponsored by corporate defendants while
emphasizing (and devaluing) the social and litigation-oriented aspects of
evidence assembled by plaintiffs. This approach exacerbates the many disadvantages already confronting plaintiffs.
Here, it is important to recognize that only the corporations have options. They could sponsor research at arms-length, disclose funding arrangements with scientists and research institutions, register all of their
clinical trials and make all of their data publicly available, but they choose
not to. There are not compelling commercial reasons for all of these
choices. Existing doctrinal and adjectival rules compel plaintiffs to rely
primarily on published studies and disclosed materials, notwithstanding
the fact that many of these studies are sponsored by litigation-wizened defendants and, whether disclosed or not, undertaken by scientists with industry linkages and/or financial conflicts. 1 60 Where research identifies
heightened risks or other adverse findings of potential value to plaintiffs,
corporate defendants routinely confound the issues by suppression, sponsoring and gerrymandering further studies, formally criticizing the methods and protocols of the existing studies, perhaps in conjunction with the
credibility of the scientists involved. 1 6' These deconstructive efforts may
160. Whether disclosure is undertaken in good faith or for highly strategic

reasons is unknown. For a discussion of "plausible deniability," see

MICHAEL

LYNCH & DAVID BOGEN, THE SPECTACLE OF HISTORY- SPEECH, TEXT AND MEMORY AT
THE IRAN-CoNTRA HEARINGS (1996).

161. See Paul Fischer, Science and Subpoenas: When Do the Courts Become Instruments of Manipulation?, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE
DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, supra note 96, at 86-92. Fischer makes the
persuasive point that sometimes it would be easier for the aggrieved companies to
simply replicate the offending studies rather than attack scientists and their performance. See id. This course of action, however, is very rarely undertaken, even
when the studies could be reproduced quickly and inexpensively. Fischer's work
recognizes that discrediting previous studies has other more instrumental and demonstrative functions:
Had RJR [RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company] been concerned about the
veracity of our findings, it could have duplicated our research in several
weeks for a few thousand dollars. Instead, the corporation spent two and
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occur prior to litigation as well as in court. Adverse studies, including large
credible studies funded with public monies and undertaken by scientists
without conflicts of interest, are often criticized by corporate consultants
and advisers.
It is both unfortunate and curious, then, that judges have been so
complicit in the exclusion of plaintiffs' expert evidence especially if corporations are allowed to introduce science for litigation-that is, their own
sponsored research-where a case makes it to trial. But even this is to put
it too mildly. Private corporations are strategically developing research
and cultivating the published scientific (especially biomedical) medical record to assist with the marketing of their products as well as the management of regulatory and legal risks. And, unlike the average plaintiff,
private corporations have considerable experience and resources in terms
of study design, reporting and publication. Federal judges would seem to
have taken an inexplicably narrow view of science for litigation. Relying
upon public rhetorics, or folk versions, of expertise, federal judges have
blinded themselves to the relations between science and capital and the
1 62
incredibly strategic (and cynical) potential of corporations.
One final issue, particularly apposite to public health and safety, concerns the stultifying effects of recent admissibility jurisprudence on public
health research:
[M]anufacturers understand the significance of science to liability and regulation so well that they may actually resist conducting
basic tests on their products or auditing the potential harms
caused by their activities. As long as scientific information can be
incriminating and lead to costly liability and regulatory require163
ments, ignorance is bliss.
And, "[w]orse, as word gets out that policy-relevant [i.e. public health and
environmental] research is likely to precipitate vicious attacks from economically interested industries, academic scientists may shy away from
such research, preferring instead to labor in less controversial
164
vineyards."
The admissibility difficulties confronting plaintiffs manifest in a variety of ways. Corporations now have fewer incentives to undertake safety
research. Because safety and efficacy research always has the potential to
assist future claimants, defendants-who are not required to prove anything when sued-have few incentives to undertake it. Safety research,
even in-house and confidential research, entails the possibility that compaa half years, and a great deal more money, in an attempt to access every
page in my files."
Id.
162. SeeJOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRa-os, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION

(2000).
163. See Wagner & Steinzor, supra note 130, at 5.
164. See id. at 25.
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nies will subsequently be vilified for not disclosing risks or acting on the
basis of retrospectively constructed cognizance.
Our current regimes of admissibility and proof discourage research
and prevent public reviews of manufactured products and corporate behavior. Removed from obligations to persuasively demonstrate the safety
and efficacy of their products, particularly once they have secured marketing approval, we have reached the parlous situation where federal courts
have made it preferable for manufacturers to avoid safety research, or to
strategically sponsor research designed to assist with marketing and litigation, rather than assiduously pursue research into public health. Raised
admissibility standards have shifted responsibility for proof of risk to individual citizens.
B.

Criminal (In)Justice: Tough on Crime, Soft on State Science

Another way to identify the practical limitations of science for litigation
and simultaneously to unravel some of its ideological dimensions is to consider its impact on the criminal justice system. Against expectations, perhaps, admissibility standards do not seem to have been applied with the
same kind of vigor in criminal trials. Notwithstanding the supreme importance of reliable evidence and accurate decision-making, given the seriousness of conviction, with relatively few exceptions federal (and state) judges
have been reluctant to hold the government's experts-forensic scientists
and technicians-to the same kinds of standards they routinely require of
expert witnesses appearing on behalf of civil claimants like the Joiners and
165
Carmichaels.
Returning to Daubert on remand, we can see that in developing science
for litigation,Judge Kozinski was conscious of an asymmetry between the
civil and criminal spheres. Having introduced the purpose of expert evidence as an important consideration in admissibility decision-making,
Kozinski qualified its implications for forensic scientific evidence:
[FN5] There are, of course, exceptions. Fingerprint analysis,
voice recognition, DNA fingerprinting and a variety of other scientific endeavors closely tied to law enforcement may indeed
have the courtroom as a principal theatre of operations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Chischill,, 30 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir.1994) (ad-

mitting expert testimony concerning a DNA match as proof the
defendant committed sexual abuse and murder). As to such dis165. In many cases, plaintiffs' experts in civil cases are much better qualified
to testify than the technical experts routinely appearing on behalf of the state in
criminal matters. For example, the Carmichaels' expert, prevented by the Supreme Court from testifying about tire wear and damage, had worked for Michelin
America for ten years and possessed a Masters Degree in Engineering from Georgia Institute of Technology.
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ciplines, the fact that the expert has developed an expertise principallyfor
purposes of litigation will obviously not be a substantialconsideration.166

Kozinski recognized that some types of scientific endeavors have the courtroom as their "principal theatre of operations."' 67 For reasons that are
not explained, however, he suggests that these purposes "will obviously not
be a substantial consideration."1 68 The state's expert evidence seems to be
inoculated from contamination (by the socio-legal) in ways that criminal
defendants' (and plaintiffs') evidence is not, and ordinarily cannot be, inoculated. Interestingly, there is no reference here to the redemptive potential of peer review and publication. Confidence in the state's forensic
sciences seems to be an article of faith paralleling the general confidence
in commercially-oriented, pre-litigation, "public health" research. The
great irony here, of course, is that of all the locations in our legal system
where one party should bear responsibility for producing reliable expert
evidence, it is the prosecution in criminal matters. Yet these are some of
the very cases where busy federal judges have been reluctant to extend
their (putatively) skeptical gaze to the state, its scientists and its technicians. Margaret Berger puts this diplomatically when she suggests that
"the courts seem very conscious of the need to protect society against dan169
gerous persons."
Interestingly, in Barefoot v. Estelle,1 7 0 just a decade before he wrote the
Daubert majority decision, Justice Blackmun distinguished between the
standard of reliability required for civil litigation, which he equated with
"money damages," and those where "a person's life is at stake." 17 1 He concluded that in the latter "a greater reliability should prevail." 172 Given
these sentiments, we must wonder, "[w]hy are there higher admissibility
thresholds in civil litigation than many life and capital cases?"
While the criminal justice system may have been an important contributor to the development of standards in some of the forensic sciences,
like DNA typing and the related use of population statistics, the same
claim could not be made about many other areas of specialization-such
as latent fingerprints, handwriting analysis, voice identification, ballistics
comparisons and explosives identification-which gained legal recognition in earlier decades. These forensic sciences appear to have been
"grandfathered" and seem to be taken largely on (judicial) trust. 173 Ironi-

166. SeeDaubertv. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 n.5 (9th Cir.
1995) (emphasis added).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH S59, S64 (2005).
170. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
171. See id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. See id.
173. See Simon Cole, GrandfatheringEvidence: FingerprintAdmissibility Ruling
fromJennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1189 (2004).
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its
cally, the perceived strength of DNA typing evidence and knowledge of 174
limitations may owe much to forensic controversy and wide publicity.
As the sociologists Wynne andJasanoff have explained, courts have considerable potential if only judges are willing to allow expert evidence to be
admitted and contested. 1 75 It might be considered revealing that in the
last few years there have been persistent attempts to challenge-using the
Daubert criteria and concepts like sciencefor litigation-some of the very forensic techniques endorsed by Kozinski in 1995.176 To their discredit, fed-

eral judges have, on average, been unwilling to entertain these important
and festering controversies.
How should we interpret these circumstances? Why are federal
judges soft on the expertise adduced by the state yet hard on expert evidence mobilized by plaintiffs and those accused of crime? The differential
approaches preferred by federal judges might be thought to betray ideological and institutional anxieties. 177 High admissibility standards-which
effectively preempt litigation-suggest a skepticism of plaintiffs, their experts and lay juries. The asymmetrical application of Daubert and receptiveness to the government's litigation-oriented forensic evidence appear
to reflect an acute sensitivity to crime control and a desire to secure convictions. Institutionally, both approaches tend to reduce the likelihood
and length of resource-intensive trials, as (potential) civil actions are
"lumped," abandoned or settled (for historically low damages), and criminal cases are more likely to feature admissions, plea bargains and
convictions.
Unquestioning confidence in the state's expert evidence is both inappropriate and misplaced. Judges have an important role to play in keeping the state and its evidence reliable and accountable. Here, failures may
contribute to miscarriages of justice and institutional illegitimacy. 178 For
judicial acquiescence disadvantages the most vulnerable: minority groups;
174. See Michael Lynch, "Science Above All Else": The Inversion of Credibility Between DNA Profiling and FingerprintEvidence, in EXPERTISE IN REGULATION AND LAW,
supra note 50, at 121.
175. See BRIAN WYNNE, RATIONALITY AND RITUAL: THE WINDSCALE INQUIRY AND
NUCLEAR DECISIONS IN BRITAIN (1982); SHEILAJASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR 21119 (1995); see also Gary Edmond, Science in Court:Negotiatingthe Meaning of a "Scientific" Experiment During a Murder Trial and Some Limits to Legal Deconstructionfor the
Public Understandingof Law and Science, 20 SYDNEY L. REV. 361, 362, 377-79, 391401
(1998).
176. See Michael Lynch & Simon Cole, STS on Trial: Dilemmas of Expertise, 35
Soc. STUD. Sci. 269 (2005); D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J.
Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for RationalKnowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise",137 U. PA. L. REv. 731 (1989).
177. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: ContemporaryLegends about the Civil
Justice System, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 717, 740 (1998); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L.
REv. 1147, 1152-53 (1992).
178. Obviously there are tensions here because concerns about crime are
driven by community attitudes, politicians and the media.
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the mentally ill; the usual suspects; and those who are generally unable to
afford experts and more experienced lawyers to contest incriminating scientific, technical or other specialized evidence. 1 79 Judicial exasperation
with the heavy case loads imposed on under-resourced courts and concerns about crime, in conjunction with confidence in the state's forensic
sciences, should not, however, prevent judges from expecting (or imposing) the highest possible admissibility thresholds on the state and its experts. Governments, after all, are in the best position to improve the
standard of expert evidence relied upon by those negotiating pleas and
prosecuting crime. For reasons of public policy and social legitimacy,
judges should disaggregate themselves from the prosecution and hold the
state's expert evidence to the highest standards practicable.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The subjects discussed in this essay raise many important issues for
legal practice and public confidence in legal and regulatory institutions.
In closing, I want to raise several issues related to science for litigation, the
way it is used, and its implications.
A.

The Limits of Science for Litigation

The purposes, or apparent purposes, of research do not provide conclusive guides to reliability. We cannot systematically read what we believe
to be self-serving, interested or dependent relationships into the content
of scientific knowledge. "We cannot infer from decisions that we believe to
be self-serving that they are in fact the consequence of questionable relationships a policy maker [we might add expert witness or author] had with
different stakeholders." 180 Conflicts of interest and oriented knowledge
81
This might be
do not prove bias, distortion, inefficacy or unreliability.1
considered unfortunate. For, the influence of sponsors, employers, personal interests and (continuing) financial relationships may each affect
research orientations and outcomes in a variety of ways-sometimes ways
that can be quite difficult to detect.
Nevertheless, it would be unwise to simply ignore conflicts of interest
and funding arrangements or persist with images of expertise that blind us
182
Earto the varieties of contemporary practice and some of their risks.
lier we saw that meta-analyses of medical literatures have consistently iden179. See, e.g., Michael Lynch, The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ
Simpson "DreamTeam" and the Sociolog of Knowledge Machine, 28 Soc. STUD. Sci. 829,

853-57 (1998).
180. KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST, supra note 84, at 127, 131.
181. For a useful analysis, see Steve Woolgar, Interests and Explanation in the
Social Study of Science, 11 Soc. STUD. Sci. 365 (1981).

182. Judges should be exceedingly reluctant to develop and impose abstract
models of science, what Michael describes as "science-in-general." Rather, they
should endeavor to focus on the features of science in the local settings that are
"science-in-particular." See Mike Michael, Lay Discourses of Science: Science-in-General,
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tified strong associations between sponsorship and the results of published
research. Experience (as'well as studies) has taught us that we should be
cautious about directed research and interested knowledge and that we
should not overlook the circumstances in which knowledge is developed.
But these lessons should be applied to civil defendants as well as plaintiffs,
and to the state's forensic science as well as any exonerating evidence adduced by those accused. Many federal judges (and commentators) have
inverted what we might expect from more principled and socially responsi183
ble approaches to expertise.
Federal judges do not seem to have appreciated the prevalence and
potential significance of conflicts of interest, nor the potentially pernicious effects of some corporate behavior on the scientific and medical record. Many seem oblivious to the way modern corporations (i.e. repeat
players and serial defendants) systematically prepare research for regulatory compliance and anticipated litigation. Alarmingly, these corporate
strategies appear to be remarkably successful.
Given the manipulation of scientific research and publication, disclosure and transparency would seem to be important procedural responses.
Even where studies appear to be methodologically rigorous and supported
by broader literatures, conflicts of interests, continuing relations and funding arrangements should all be disclosed so they can be factored in. Transparency will not always provide clear answers, but in almost all
circumstances it will be a pre-requisite to any socially credible assessment
of scientific knowledge. 184 In the absence of algorithms or bright-line demarcation tools, we might want to know if scientists have previous or pending relations with the corporations whose products they study; whether
they have undertaken research which has not been registered or published; whether they have signed contracts restricting their ability to publish (or were willing to); whether they own or owned stocks or held
1 85
interests or options in the companies supporting the studies, and so on.
There is no doubt that we should approach the expert evidence assembled by plaintiffs with caution. However, we can not afford to overlook the position of the plaintiff in the overall civil justice system. It would
be a mistake to impose unrealistic expectations on plaintiffs or to judge
plaintiffs' expert evidence using implausible or onerous models of expertise, especially when the same standards might embarrass a corporate defendant were the case to go to trial. Moreover, we need to take a broader
VALUES 313, 317-20, 330-31
(1992).
183. This should not be understood as some kind of conspiracy because many
judges and commentators appear committed to their definitions of expertise.
184. Hilgartner provides instances where transparency may create difficulties
in consensus building. See STEPHEN HILGARTNER, SCIENCE ON STAGE: EXPERT ADVICE AS PUBLIC DRAMA (2000).
185. These kinds of questions are routinely asked of potential jurors and
judges.

Science-in-Particular,and Self, 17 Sci. TECH. & HUM.
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look at the evidence used for legal and regulatory purposes and the kinds
of organizations that have evolved to produce, administer and misrepresent it.

18 6

One way of approaching these issues is to think about the goals and
purposes of criminal and civil law. Without wanting to be too prescriptive
here, we might ask, "Are these purposes advanced by the way judges currently characterize scientific and expert evidence in admissibility decisionmaking?" Using tort as an example, the regulatory and restorative potential of tort law may be seriously jeopardized if plaintiffs are unable to get
their cases into court, if civil juries are prevented from considering corporate behavior and possible malfeasance and if potential defendants are
discouraged from undertaking or sponsoring independent and 1 publicly
87
accessible research into the safety and efficacy of their products.
B.

Different Standards of Admissibility and Proof?

Trial lawyers frequently decry the effects of Daubert and the exclusionary ethos. They lament the existence of too much hard Daubert, too much
gatekeeping and an obsession with science for litigation. In contrast, those
representing criminal defendants or those, like Cole, Faigman, Saks and
Risinger, trying to make the forensic sciences more accountable, cannot
get enough hard Daubert.18 8 They bemoan the failure of judges to take
their gatekeeping responsibilities seriously, rigorously apply the Daubert
criteria and extend concerns about the origins and purpose of expert evidence to the state in criminal trials. Given this state of affairs, it might be
time to begin to think about formally distinguishing admissibility standards so that plaintiffs and criminal defendants bear lower admissibility
burdens than the state. Once again we might want to reflect on the distinctive purposes of civil and criminal law and the respective capabilities of
the parties. It might also be an opportune moment to reconsider the expectations we place on the manufacturers of foods, chemicals,
186. See SHARON BEDER, GLOBAL SPIN: THE CORPORATE
(2000); RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note 124;

ASSAULT ON ENVIRONANDREW RICH, THINK
TANKS, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE (2004); J. SMITH, THE IDEA
MENTALISM

BROKERS: THINK TANKS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW POLICY ELITE (1991).

187. In consequence, Kozinski's orientation must be considered questionable, if not specious. Unfortunately, the very indicia Kozinski suggests we can rely

upon will be least reliable in the midst of scientific disagreement, uncertainty and
commercial activity. Here, Kozinski's recourse to ideals actually inverts the reality.
For, privately funded research-that is research undertaken "in the usual course of
business"-may actually be of low standards and/or designed primarily to help
with marketing (purportedly effective) products as well as minimizing the extent
of regulatory and legal exposure. We should not proceed, it would seem, as
though the published scientific record is independent and presumptively reliable
in the ways judges, like Kozinski, have confidently assumed.
188. See Lynch & Cole, supra note 176; SIMON COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A
HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND

CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION

284-86 (2001); David

Faigman, et al., How Good is Good Enough? Expert Evidence under Daubert and
Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 651, 655-57 (2000).
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pharmaceuticals, therapeutics and other consumer products as well as
those responsible for environmental degradation.
The point here is not that Daubert or some combination of criteria
captures (or could capture) the essence of (that illusory category) Science,
but rather, it is time to recognize that there are a range of models of science and different standards of admissibility that might be applied according to the type of litigation, the seriousness of the issues at stake, the
capabilities of parties as well as the kind of regulatory impact, restorative
potential and accuracy we expect from the different parts of our legal and
regulatory processes. These are salient issues in an age of deregulation
and consensus regulation, where conflicted scientists participate on government expert committees responsible for policy advice, regulation and
research funding.
In a provocative essay, Margaret Berger has suggested that we might
even think about shifting burdens of proof, especially in relation to causation, in certain types of toxic tort cases, so that multinational corporations
with resources and regulatory obligations might be required to (at least
presumptively) convincingly demonstrate the safety of their products. 1 89

This would certainly ease the burden on plaintiffs and absolve them from
having to produce peer-reviewed and published epidemiological studies
with statistically significant associations. Judges might even show sensitivity
to the range of informal ways that modern corporations have been
manipulating the published scientific and medical literatures. They could
deem sponsored research-where a corporation, corporate-sponsored entity or collective of corporations exerted control or influence-as inadmissible or presumptively suspect.
The mere fact of publication should not be used as a surrogate for
reliability-especially when the circumstances surrounding the funding,
design and publication of the research might change how it is understood.
Nor should the mere fact of publication be understood to confer the imprimatur of some nondescript and imaginary scientific community. If sponsorship systematically distorts research results, then to ignore this
pervasive feature of modern scientific practice would seem to be sociologically naive or worse. If the ICMJE is alarmed, then judges should respond.
Judges might develop rebuttable presumptions about public health
research. Unless there are signed declarations that (published) research
was not directly sponsored by corporations and that researchers do not
have conflicts of interest, then the evidence might be deemed inadmissible. The risk of unwittingly treating partisan or sponsored research-that
is, pre-litigation sciencefor litigation-asindependent or unaligned warrants
the limited inconvenience of having to demonstrate the provenance of
research by contacting authors to obtain statements about who did the
189. See Margaret A. Berger, EliminatingGeneral Causation:Notes Towards a New
Theory ofJustice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2140-52 (1997); see also
CARL CRANOR,

Toxic TORTS (2006) [hereinafter
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work, details of contractual or funding arrangements, or other financial
relations with defendants. Given the reforms in medical publication,
these kinds of disclosures should become routine features of discovery.
Published research with full disclosure should generally be admissible, although the meaning of this research could be vigorously challenged at
trial. These kinds of expectations might actually encourage manufacturers to undertake new and more socially responsible forms of product research or fund research (more) remotely.
In addition, judges could develop adjectival doctrines which prevent
the exclusion of expert evidence or grants of summary judgment where
the defendant is intending to adduce-or has previously relied upontypes of evidence similar to those advanced by plaintiffs. We could develop new procedures such as admissibility estoppel where defendants are
obliged to indicate if they intend to introduce similar types of evidence
and similar methods to those routinely and aggressively denounced during pre-trial admissibility hearings. If a defendant sought to challenge the
admissibility of a type of evidence-such as meta-analysis of epidemiological studies or physical inspection of tires-the defendant could be prevented from adducing evidence of that type if the case proceeds to trial.
Civil defendants should not be encouraged to cynically exploit pre-trial
procedures. Admissibility estoppel would not prevent credibility, methodological and interpretative challenges, but these would become issues for
the trial and the jury. Any defendant would have a choice. Similarly, if
serial defendants have relied upon a specific methodology or technique in
other trials-such as the meta-analysis of epidemiological evidence or toxicological studies-then they should be prevented, in the absence of compelling justification, from contesting these types of evidence and
approaches at their convenience (i.e. strategically) in other litigation. 190
Less controversially, judges should be attentive to the entire evidentiary record assembled by both parties and should be careful about making admissibility decisions in isolation or in a piecemeal fashion. The
majority assessment of the evidence in Joiner is a regrettable instance of
this "corpuscular" tendency. 19 1 Judges should consider the weight of evidence rather than quibble with isolated features or extrapolations from individual studies. 192 Given the difficulties and costs of public health
research, and given the inevitable limitations with epidemiological studies,
judges should not simply dismiss plaintiffs' evidence-even when comprised of animal and in vitro studies or toxicology-unless the defendant
190. This would be better than treating the evidence itself as some kind of
binding precedent. See generallyJohn Monahan & Laurens Walker, Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REv. 801 (2000).

191. See Carl Cranor, The Dual Legacy ofDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: TradingJunk Science for Insidious Science, in REsCuING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS:
REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, supra note 96, at 120,
131, 134 [hereinafter Cranor, Dual Legacy]; McGarity, supra note 103, at 36-39.
192. See CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS, supra note 189, at 75-79.
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can persuasively demonstrate that such evidence has little or no value.
Judges should be thinking about the practical difficulties of proof as well
as the evidence to be adduced by defendants and the extent to which defendants have exerted influence over research-even research published
in respectable peer-reviewed journals-when making admissibility
determinations.
With respect to defendants, judges might consider any failure (or
omission) to undertake research or to organize research of sufficient quality and independence. The fact that industry, manufacturers and health
care providers have legal and moral obligations to consumers and citizens,
as well as the resources to undertake or fund high-quality (at arms- length)
safety and efficacy research, should all be in the foreground of expectations and assessments. This should include assessments of the amount of
reliable knowledge and the extent of uncertainty. Defendants ought not
to be rewarded for inactivity, sponsoring research of poor quality or low
power or fostering uncertainty, secrecy and even duplicity.
In criminal cases judges should be exceedingly reluctant to disallow
expert evidence adduced by defendants. Unless the evidence has such
limited probative value as to be close to irrelevant and/or universally derided as unreliable, judges should, on grounds of principle, be willing to
admit it. Here, we could, perhaps against expectations, draw on a fragment of Kozinski's judgment: "[T]he court and the parties are not limited
to what is generally accepted; methods accepted by a minority in the scientific community may well be sufficient."19 3 Rather than wade through the
meanings attributable to peer review and publication or wrestle with methodological imbroglios, judges should probably use more sociologically-oriented heuristics like minority acceptance during admissibility decisionmaking. In the past, during the Frye era, experts' claims about the field
were frequently taken on trust. This might continue, although where
there was disagreement, minority acceptance could be supported by reference to literatures or affidavits from other experts or even the evidence of
sociologists, anthropologists and legal scholars studying areas of science
and/or scientific controversy. Obviously, any claims could be challenged
and the ipse dixit of the expert, or "fields" composed of only one or two
tightly-knit individuals, might be treated with the skepticism they deserve.
For admissibility decision-making, minority acceptance is easier to administer and, appropriately, a less restrictive standard than aggressively ap193. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 n.lI (9th Cir.
1995). Typically, Kozinski qualifies the more liberal possibilities of such a
standard:
However, the party proffering the evidence must explain the expert's
methodology and demonstrate in some objectively verifiable way that the
expert has both chosen a reliable scientific method and followed it faithfully. Of course, the fact that one party's experts use a methodology accepted by only a minority of scientists would be a proper basis for
impeachment at trial.
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plied hard and supersized Daubert. It is also easier to ascertain the existence
of a minority than whether some techniques, equipment or approaches
have gained "general acceptance" in some field or among a majority of
practitioners. 11 4 The value of the evidence, its meaning in relation to the
litigation and its limitations can all be developed during the course of the
trial. This kind of approach is more consistent with centuries of legal
practice and a continuing participatory role for citizens in the guise of the
lay jury.
As for the state, there seem to be few convincing reasons why it
should not be burdened with the most onerous standard in our entire
legal system when adducing expert evidence against defendants in serious
criminal trials. Maybe the state's forensic scientists should have to pass the
strictures imposed by hard Daubert or some similarly onerous standard
more credibly linked to scientific practice-such as the general acceptance
standard supplemented with Daubert-style criteria like established error
rates. Acceptance alone may be inadequate because some of the techniques
relied upon by state-employed technicians and scientists-like latent fingerprinting, ballistics, hair and explosives comparison and handwriting
analysis-may have (or have had) acceptance among practitioners even
though the extent of their reliability is unknown.
C.

Simplification, Emphasis, Omission and Representation

One of the features of the whole science for litigation discourse is that
evidence conspicuously developed or adapted for litigation tends to be
stigmatized, but evidence developed in ways that can be displacedthrough strategic representation-from the immediate Iegal context tends
to be treated (by judges, at least) as independent and implicitly reliable.
We have already seen how these kinds of commitments are inconsistent
with modern commercial realities. But there are additional complexities
with science for litigation. Focusing on whether evidence was developed for
a particular case tends to overlook the tremendous amount of work that
lawyers and experts (on all sides) need to undertake in order to translate
expertise, studies, information and experience into a tractable legal cause
of action.
There is an abundance of judicial commentary about the dangers of
science for litigation but almost nothing written about how lawyers and
experts should identify and translate vast amounts of formal and informal
specialized knowledge and experience into the sui generis contours of a
case. What makes selection, emphasis and omission appropriate or inappropriate? What ought to limit or shape simplification? Can knowledge
remain stable as it moves between contexts? If lawyers select an expert
194. "Field" or "discipline" needs to be recognized as flexible, contingent and
mutable. Obviously, there may be ongoing issues about what constitutes the appropriate field or set of relevant experts/practitioners. All standards will have
these kinds of interpretative and classificatory issues.
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who is among a minority or known to be inclined to a particular view, does
the mere fact of selection make the expert partisan and their pre-disposition or pre-litigation orientation science for litigation? Issues of selection,
translation, simplification and representation raise difficulties that endanger and blunt the utility of science for litigation. But the issues are more
complex still.
Another important, but relatively unexplored, dimension of adversarial litigation is the fact that a party's lawyers engage and brief the expert
witnesses. This means that experts, particularly those who do not consult
or appear regularly, tend to be at the mercy of the broader account of the
case and the interpretation of the law supplied by lawyers. In addition,
interactions between lawyers and experts are usually brief and sometimes
cursory. Even well-intentioned lawyers can create difficulties for experts
and judges if they base their selection of experts on strategic legal interpretations or fail to clearly convey some of the substantial rules and procedures to the experts.
In a recent empirical study of disputes over geographical indications
for wine regions in Australia, I found that several expert geographers were
criticized for producing science for litigation simply because they relied
on the interpretation of a set of regulations preferred by the lawyers who
had engaged them. 195 The particular interpretation was inclusive-informed by the background to an international treaty and the domestic
regulations which emerged in its aftermath. When the Tribunal eventually rejected this "inclusive" approach, the expert evidence-tightly coupled with the legal interpretation-was marginalized and able to be
presented in a way that made the experts appear partisan. The fact that
the geographers' understanding of the regulations shaped the way they
developed their evidence and drew a boundary for the particular wine region was effectively ignored. The Tribunal decoupled the evidence from
the legal interpretation supporting it and vilified the experts on the basis
that they had produced expert evidence which was inconsistent with what
became the authoritative legal interpretation. Here, experts were criticized
for providing partisan opinions even though their expert opinions were
based on a particular interpretation of the law which was rejected by the
Tribunal after the geographers had developed and presented their
evidence.
Interestingly, when the Tribunal's decision was reviewed during an
appeal to the Federal Court of Australia on a matter of law, that court
dismissed the Tribunal's interpretation of the regulations. Perhaps predictably, the geographers' credibility and opinions were not rehabilitated
or even reconsidered in the light of the Federal Court's revised interpretation. Vilifications are rarely reversed even when new legal interpretations
might facilitate more favorable treatment and even the redemption of the
195. See Gary Edmond, Disorderwith Law: Determiningthe GeographicalIndication
for the Coonawarra Wine Region, 27 ADELAIDE L. REv. 55 (2006).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss4/6

60

Edmond: Supersizing Daubert Science for Litigation and Its Implications f

2007]

SUPERSIZING DAUBERT

917

expert evidence. 19 6 This example is particularly useful because it captures
some of the diachronic complexity of law-science interactions as well as
how ideas like science for litigation can be invoked-as they were by the
Tribunal-to rhetorically manage dispreferred expertise. Marginalizing
the geographers' evidence as science for litigation meant that the Tribunal did not have to address the substance of their expert evidence in
detail.
While the events in the previous paragraph are more likely to occur in
circumstances where the substantive law is not particularly evolved or settled, the example illustrates the contingency and interpretive flexibility
potentially available to lawyers,judges and experts. It also introduces temporal, spatial and interactive dimensions to our understanding of expertise. What counts as law and how to integrate law and evidence may
change over time and space. It also suggests that because law-science interactions are "thick," there is a need not just to consider the field(s), the
studies and the information available, but these have to be refined and
developed in a way that makes them (not just relevant but) strategically
valuable and admissible.
Lawyers, experts and judges are constantly wrestling with expertise
and law, their interactions and their integration. Here, "expertise" and
"law" are simply labels for larger and more complex processes and assemblages of knowledge and practice. 197 However, interpreting them as fundamentally separate domains is potentially misleading. Each shapes or
influences how the other is developed, represented and understood.
Moreover, moves or interpretations in either the law and/or the evidence
can be decisive. Decision-makers, like the Tribunal in the previous example, are likely to resort to familiar tropes like "'partisan," "junkscience" and
"good science"-all features of the science for litigation worldview-rather
than consider the complex institutional, professional and rhetorical
dimensions of different kinds of expertise and how evidence might be
modified to suit legal categories and audiences. Decision-makers are also
unlikely to consider how legal and regulatory settings may actually shape
scientific practice and the content of scientific knowledge.
The socio-economic significance of law and legal processes means
that, whether judges like it or not and regardless of their level of awareness, legal activity encourages science for litigation and defensive scientific
research in locations remote from (actual or anticipated) litigation. Legal
categories, legal doctrine and the possibility of litigation all shape the content and reporting of much contemporary scientific research.

196. See Sheila Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co-Production,in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE
(SheilaJasanoff ed., 2004); Gary Edmond, JudgingFacts: ManagingExpert Knowledges
in Legal Decision Making, in EXPERTISE IN REGULATION AND LAW, supra note 50, at
136; Gary Edmond, ConstructingMiscarriagesofJustice: MisunderstandingScientific Evidence in High Profile CriminalAppeals, 22 Ox. J. LEG. STUD. 53 (2002).
197. See IRWIN & MICHAEL, supra note 65.
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Ethical Solutions?

Once we introduce more sophisticated models of science and expertise, questions of ethics and ethical sensibilities become potentially quite
complex. Once we lose the power of a single efficacious method and prescriptive (or restrictive) norms, the meaning of expertise and the behavior
of experts, lawyers and judges becomes not just messier but more intimately related.' 9 8 Knowledge claims and the value of knowledge become
harder to extricate from specific contexts and particular purposes.
Rather than try to erect ethical obligations around synthetic models
of expertise, however, we need to develop more critical ethical sensibilities
which recognize the complexities and diversity of modern scientific practices as well as the goals of our civil and criminal justice systems. The complexity associated with different kinds of scientific practice and expert
disagreement will not be resolved through the imposition of simplistic ethical duties and expectations. The example of conflicts of interest demonstrated how mandatory rules-let alone norms-did not guarantee
compliance. Instead, the ICMJE simply banned some types of sponsored
studies (e.g. reviews and cost-effectiveness assessments) where an author
had a financial conflict of interest and required the formal registration of
clinical trials before findings could even be considered for publication.
To reinforce the difficulties with ethical solutions, an example might
help. In recent litigation in South Australia, an anthropologist (Fergie)
who appeared on behalf of a group of indigenous people seeking to prevent the construction of a bridge, in what was allegedly a culturally-sensitive environment, was vilified in the popular press and the findings of a
Royal Commission. The anthropologist was subsequently sued for negligence and for breaches of the Trade Practices Act (Cth)-for misleading
and deceptive conduct in "trade and commerce"-by developers who alleged her expert report had delayed construction of the bridge and bankrupted the resort and residential estate they were building on Hindmarsh
Island. Fergie was subsequently vindicated in the Federal Court of Australia, primarily because of technical legal issues pertaining to the ability of a
third party (here the developers) to sue an expert who appeared for another party, in negligence, and whether an expert (here the anthropologist) who was consulting through her University's commercialization arm
was actually engaged in "trade and commerce" according to the way the
Trade Practices Act had been interpreted. 199
198. See David Caudill, Legal Ethics and Scientific Testimony: In Defense of
Manafacuting Uncertainty, DeconstructingExpertise, and Other Trial Strategies, 52 VILL.
L. REv. 953 (2007); David Caudill, EthicalDimensions of Law-Science Relations in US.

Courtrooms, in

EXPERTISE IN REGULATION AND LAw,

supra note 50, at 184.

199. See Gary Edmond, Thick Decisions: Expertise, Advocacy and Reasonableness in
the Federal Court of Australia, 74 OCEANIA 190 (2004). Interestingly, Justice von
Doussa did not consider Fergie's consulting work to undertaken in "trade or
commerce."
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Fergie was originally approached in relation to an injunction to stop
the construction of the bridge joining Hindmarsh Island to the mainland.
At very short notice she was asked to write a report about secret-sacred
knowledge (known colloquially as "secret women's business") held by a
select group of Aboriginal female elders which was publicly disclosed just
as construction on the bridge was scheduled to commence. While familiar
with many of the issues and an experienced anthropologist, Fergie had

not formally studied the local culture and history of the peoples involved.
Like many areas of public health, knowledge of Australian Aboriginal society, tradition and history has many gaps. Without the anthropologist's intervention, however, the women who claimed that connecting Hindmarsh
Island to the mainland was culturally inappropriate would have been denied an effective voice and any decision-maker or judge-especially if
male-would have been in a culturally and epistemologically awkward position. This raised the first of many ethical quandaries. Should Fergie
have applied the (limited) expertise she possessed to these politically sensitive issues or taken the easier option of disengagement, knowing that the
injunction and action against the bridge would probably fail?

Where this case becomes particularly illuminating is in relation to the
conflicting ethical obligations and duties confronting the anthropologist.
Fergie owed obligations or duties to the Court (in many Australian jurisdictions this duty has been formalized); the lawyers and the Aboriginal
organization that retained and remunerated her; the custodians who had
been obliged to disclose culturally sensitive knowledge; her profession; the
University of Adelaide and its consulting company; a small group of dissentient Aboriginal women who contested the existence of the secret
knowledge; her own public credibility and personal integrity, and so
on. 200 The judge hearing the case in the Federal Court indicated that in
certain circumstances an expert like Fergie might even owe some obliga200. Many of these obligations could be developed in detail, but the responsibilities of a professional anthropologist are suggestive of the complexities. According to the Australian Anthropological Society's Code of Ethics (2003),
anthropologists have a range of responsibilities and duties. Some of the those relevant to the Hindmarsh Island Bridge litigation might include:
3.10 Anthropologists should not knowingly or avoidably allow information gained on a basis of trust and cooperation of the research participants to be used against their legitimate interests by hostile third parties.
4.2 Anthropologists should maintain integrity in the recording and presentation of anthropological data, and should not discredit the profession
of anthropology by knowingly colouring or falsifying observations or interpretations, or making exaggerated or ill-founded assertions, in their
professional writings, as expert witnesses, or as authors of any other form
of reportage related to their work.
5.2 Anthropologists should not accept anthropological work which they
are insufficiently qualified to do, whether by way of training or
experience ....
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tion to the developers-that is, if she had been engaged in "trade and
commerce" or their loss was causally related to a negligent expert report
and was foreseeable. While this example may be somewhat unusual, it
clearly demonstrates how an expert may have a range of competing and
conflicting interests, obligations and duties which can become quite difficult to reconcile or manage even where experts are primarily concerned
with assisting a court in good faith. As the wine regionalization example
illustrated, the fact that interpretations of the law and/or evidence can
change diachronically-especially as fresh evidence is adduced or a judge
decides whether a paid consultant is engaged in "trade and commerce"can make ethical obligations, legal assessments and expertise particularly
20 1
unwieldy.
It is no coincidence that ethical considerations bear many similarities
to the earlier discussion of norms. In the absence of refinement or detail,
ethical precepts are often insufficiently prescriptive to guide activity. The
proper ethical course in a particular situation may be unclear and there
may be a broad range of counter-ethics (i.e. alternative ethical stances)
that might be credibly invoked to justify a range of inconsistent actions.
Ethics and ethical stipulations depend on our models of expertise,
our epistemologies, and our broader social commitments. In consequence, different models of expertise and the recognition that science
and expertise are fundamentally social might require more sophisticated
responses. 20 2 Once we realize how complex and subtle modern scientific
practice and evidence can be, the attraction of ethical solutions tends to
recede.
7.1 Anthropologists should take care to know of and generally understand the requirements of laws affecting their professional activity.
8. Responsibility to the wider public
Anthropologists also have responsibilities towards other members of the
public and wider society. They depend upon the confidence of the public
and they should in their work attempt to promote and preserve such confidence without exaggerating the accuracy or explanatory power of their
findings.
Australian Anthropological Society, Code of Ethics (2003), http://www.aas.asn.au/
docs/AASCodeof_Ethics.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
201. Moreover, anthropologists tend to be sympathetic to the plight of indigenous Australians, especially at the hands of Anglo-Australian law and many may,
for deep(er) ethical reasons, be willing to use legal processes (or research) instrumentally in order to address or correct past injustices. Such instrumental ethical
stances may be comprehensible when we consider the massive over-representation
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait islander peoples in Australian jails, their poor
health, low life expectancies, and low standard of living. Along with historical relations, these ongoing existential issues, condition the construction of specialized
anthropological knowledge and mediate access to subjects.
202. See BRUNO LATOUR, PANDORA'S HOPE: EssAys ON THE REALITY OF SCIENCE
STUDIES (1999).
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Political Origins: The Genealogy of Science for Litigation and

Junk Science
This brings me to my final points-intended to place the emergence
of the exclusionary ethos, skepticism toward science for litigation and hysteria about junk science into a broader socio-legal context. Once again Kozinski's judgment is instructive. Consider the source of authority in the
extracts below:
[6] That an expert testifies based on research he has conducted
independent of the litigation provides important, objective proof
that the research comports with the dictates of good science. See
Peter W. Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom 206-09 (1991) (describing how the prevalent practice of
expert-shopping leads to bad science).2o3
And,
[7] If the proffered expert testimony is not based on independent research, the party proffering it must come forward with
other objective, verifiable evidence that the testimony is based on
"scientifically valid principles." One means of showing this is by
proof that the research and analysis supporting the proffered
conclusions have been subjected to normal scientific scrutiny
through peer review and publication. [FN6] Huber, Galileo's Revenge at 209 (suggesting that "[t]he ultimate test of [a scientific
expert's] integrity is her readiness to publish and be
damned") .204

Science for litigation,along with the concept of 'junk science"-which
trades on the idea that there are simple ways to demarcate between good
and bad science-were popularized in the years immediately before the
Supreme Court's Daubert decision, most notably by Peter Huber of the
Manhattan Institute. 20 5 The Institute is a New York-based think tank committed to economic choice, individual responsibility and pro-corporate law
reform. It would not seem to be a coincidence that it is sponsored by
some of the largest corporations in the United States, including Abbott
Laboratories, Alcoa Inc., Exxon Mobil, General Motors, Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer Inc. and so on.
Throughout this essay I have explained how the images of science
appearing in federal jurisprudence bear limited correspondence to the
way the modern sciences are organized and practiced or the way the sci203. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-18 (9th Cir.
1995) (italics added).
204. Id. at 1318. (italics added, footnote omitted).
205. After the success of GALILEO'S REVENGE, Foster and Huber sought to consolidate their work. See KENNETH FOSTER & PETER HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS (1997).
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ences are treated in specialized scholarly literatures. This introduces a
grand irony to this attempt to understand the origins of Daubert and science
for litigation. Attempting to address a range of institutional and professional difficulties, like widespread impressions of a litigation crisis-allegedly

fueled

by

science for litigation-and popular

concerns

about

malfunctioning legal institutions, federal judges have themselves embraced, wait for it, images of science for litigation. Put simply, federal judges

have embraced corporate-sponsored models of expertise-like 'junk science," science for litigationand the resurrection of Popperian falsificationand applied them in ways that reveal their anxieties, prejudices and insti20 6
tutional vulnerability.
Unfortunately, the impacts of these developments have not been limited to the federal courts. 20 7 One of the most disconcerting aspects of this
whole episode is that judicial use of concepts like science for litigation actually encourages for-profit corporations to engage in the kinds of research
practices which the leading medical and scientific journals (e.g. ICMJE)
are trying to eliminate. The failure to register trials, disclose conflicts of
interests or declare funding arrangements means that scientific and medical literatures and much of the evidence adduced by corporate defendants
presents a misleading impression of its independence and reliability as
well as the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals, therapeutic products,
manufactured goods and foods.
By selecting different models of science and expertise, judges could
help to improve the quality of medical and scientific publication and the
safety of therapeutics and consumer products. More empirically
grounded models of science and expertise might also allow plaintiffs back
into the courts and make manufacturers more accountable for the safety
and efficacy of their products and practices.
F.

Downsizing Daubert: RecapturingLegal Legitimacy

Federal judges have adopted admissibility standards which systematically privilege large manufacturers and other for-profit collectives. These
admissibility standards are predicated upon images of science and expertise developed and promoted by the very groups they are supposed to regulate. They are strategic ideas enlisted to help in a contemporary (and
continuing) socio-legal struggle around responsibility for risk, damage and
illness. Those with the greatest concentration of economic and epistemic
power are effectively privileged, regardless of their own research practices
or approaches to expertise, over individual plaintiffs and indigent criminal
defendants. It is no coincidence that ideas like science for litigation are
rarely invoked against defendants. In the end, science for litigation is a
crude and unreliable means of evaluating expert knowledge. Applied in206. See Edmond, Just Truth, supra note 4.

207. Many state courts and legislatures have also embraced the exclusionary
ethos.
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sensitively, it is poorly suited to litigation. Moreover, substantial doctrine
and constitutional guarantees should not be swept away or eviscerated by
changes to adjectival law based on controvertible images of expertise, objectivity and ethical objectives.
More critical appraisals of modern scientific practice suggest the inappropriateness of the Daubert criteria and asymmetrical expressions of concerns about science for litigation. Contemporary jurisprudence minimizes
the potential for law to enhance scientific research or discipline corporate
malfeasance. Imagine having your tort action rejected on the basis that
your expert evidence was science for litigation, or did not comply with
Daubert, when the corporate defendant had suppressed or abandoned
safety studies, sponsored studies designed to show commercially favorable
or ambiguous results, and, if the case got to trial, was proposing to use
similar kinds of studies and evidence to that which they uncompromisingly
challenged at a pre-trial admissibility hearing.
What should judges do? Federal judges should begin to think about
an exit strategy. They should be systematically downsizing Daubert. They
should start winding-back the Daubert era by rejecting simplistic models of
science and revising their anxiety about plaintiffs and civil juries. They
should also begin to apply the Daubert criteria more flexibly and take a
more expansive view of science for litigation that extends to the state and
corporate-sponsored science. They should also reflect on the type of litigation and the rights, interests and responsibilities at stake. Judges should
also consider the kinds of evidence and the resources available to the parties. This assessment should include the kinds of evidence that ought to
be available if manufacturers were responsible corporate citizens. Manufacturers and polluters should not be allowed to resile from their continuing obligations to consumers and citizens or be rewarded for shifting the
costs of their harms. Restrictive admissibility standards have prevented the
testing of the evidence supporting drugs, therapeutics, chemicals and
other products and the scientific and technical bases, behind the state's
forensic techniques. Federal judges ought to consider how to facilitate
expert disagreement in public contexts. As interested and conflicted

scientists crowd our public advisory committees and expert panels, courts
remain one of the few domains where modern knowledge and corporate
conduct might be publicly contested and experts from a range of perspectives examined and held to exacting standards.
The challenge for the federal judiciary is to resist simplistic models of
science and the institutional efficiencies they seem to confer by developing more critical and principled approaches which take account of the
many (and sometimes competing) aims of our legal system. If judges are
unable to identify more credible ways of identifying reliable evidence or
managing evidence, then the answer may be to have fewer pre-trial admissibility hearings and more jury trials. Juries, it would seem, can do pretty
well with expert evidence and very well when it comes to understanding
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the social context of scientific research, corporate strategy and issues of
20 8
malfeasance.
In closing we can only wonder how many deserving plaintiffs have
been left without remedy and how many innocent people accepted pleas
or were convicted on the basis of corporate and government science for
litigation.

20 9

208. See Stephen Daniels, The Question ofJury Competence and the Politics of Civil
Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
269, 270, 284 (1989); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Scientific Literacy and the Jury:
ReconsideringJury 'Competence 6 PUB. UNDERSTANDING Sci. 329 (1997).
209. See Carl Cranor, Dual Legacy, supra note 191, at 122. According to Cranor: "The legitimacy of law as an institution is being threatened; legal decisions are
vulnerable to challenge of being illegitimate, incomplete, or, too often, just
wrong." See id.; see also Edmond, Just Truth, supra note 4.
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